


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18

IDEOLOGIES IN LANGUAGE CONTACT SITUATIONS

The case of Arabic–Hebrew in Palestine*

Nancy Hawker

Introduction

Speakers make sense of their experience of the world through ideologies which are manifested in discernible linguistic practices, which in turn form experiences of the world. There are flexible links between specific instances of speech, generalised patterns of linguistic practices and ideologies relevant for the political (including military), economic and social contexts. This chapter is concerned with the various linguistic practices of Arabic–Hebrew contact that have been researched sociolinguistically, and places them in relation to ideologies that inform the worldviews of speakers in Palestine and Israel.

Language ideologies have been defined as socially constructed norms and ideas of differentiation that associate an idealised variety of a language with a particular people, event or activity (Irvine & Gal 2000). The connection between language ideology and political ideology has been demonstrated in sociolinguistics with regards to standardised monolingualism and nationalism, and this will be found relevant in the Israel/Palestine case. Here as well, the nationalist projects of one-nation-one-language have had ideological and political impact on Zionism and Hebrew, and on Palestinian nationalism and purist Arabic campaigns. Clearly a focus on language contact, consisting of borrowing and codeswitching, problematises the nationalist equation. But this chapter goes further, in examining not only the contact phenomena and reactions to them in light of the one-nation-one-language equation, but also how these phenomena relate to the other political ideologies in circulation.

It is with the aim of demonstrating the subtle ideological uses of language that this chapter proceeds. Ideology here occupies a conceptual space overlapping with identity and culture. “Ideology” as a term is preferred over “identity” because in the Palestinian and Israeli contexts, identity is overdetermined by ethnographic categories which are the products of nationalism, itself exacerbated by armed conflict and other forms of inter-group violence. Consequently, “identity” has little scope for polyvalent applications to Arabic–Hebrew contact phenomena, whereas “ideology” retains these qualities. Ideology is also preferred over “culture”, which is broader than “ideology”. Though culture is also often treated as part of the context for speech in which power relations are played out (Hall 1993; Irvine 2001), it is also sometimes seen as static or at least stable, and also, essentially, ethno-national (Fishman et al. 1991; Jandt 2012; Bassiouney 2012). Analytically, “ideology” forefronts power struggles at all

levels of its reproductions, adaptations and challenges (Mouffe 1979; Butler 1997), and thus lends itself to critical ethnography and critical discourse analysis, which are the methods of linguistic analysis used to present the evidence in this chapter. Central to the argument here is the possibility of identifying multiple ideologies operative linguistically at specific historical junctions, rather than seeing in language the expression of national culture, which tends to offer conservative explanations (Williams 1992; Bucholtz & Hall 2005).

The ideologies identified for the present purposes are, firstly, Zionism. In its state-building form (as contrasted with cultural or spiritual Zionism), this ideology was historically conceived as European Jewish emancipatory nationalism and expressed as justification for ethnically exclusive control over land in Palestine. Zionist ideology is now available to all Jews and some evangelical Christians as a broad expression of support for Israeli government policies. Second is Securitism, which is an Israeli conception of the supremacy of military concerns in internal Israeli state organisation and as projected over parts of the Middle East. The ideology has global traction, especially in US and UK foreign policy after 9/11. Third, Resilience: this is the English translation of the Arabic *ṣumūd*, the Palestinian expression for the ability to “get on with life” despite, and while accommodating, Israeli restrictions. Fourth, Palestinian nationalism: this is an ideology which expresses a will to challenge selected Israeli policies that violate Palestinian rights, and to lay a basis for putative collective self-determination. Fifth, Consumerism: this is a global trend that encourages the pursuit of social status through the purchase of products. And finally, Sexism: a particular current of patriarchy and hetero-normativity impacting Israeli and Palestinian men and women’s social behaviours. These ideologies, manifest in policies and practices, have been studied by political scientists in relation to Israel/Palestine, but not specifically in relation to language within that context, as will be seen below.

The analysis relies on definitions adapted from political philosophy, cultural studies and ethnography. In these disciplines, ideology is a system of ideas produced by multiple and historically specific institutions prone to change (Althusser 2006). Ideologies make sense of the world (the context) to subjects who experience it in everyday life as their habitus (Bourdieu 1972), and who are nurtured to think about their experience (Dean 2014). Articulation (Hall 1996; Grossberg 1986) links practices, common-sensically carried out in the habitus, to ideologies. Articulation pulls, or interpellates (Butler 1997), subjects in given directions which remain flexible, and plays on the second meaning of “articulation” as voicing. Language practices are a particular type of social practice identified by empirical documentation of speech (the text) and processed sociolinguistically in ways that point to patterns and aspects of the practices that are not readily accessible in daily or ordinary experience, although in the first instance speech is thought about common-sensically by interlocutors (Bourdieu 1972: 202).

The analysis flexibly links text to context. The goal is to propose more than the intuition of the researcher to classify such-and-such language practice as “Zionist” or “Sexist”, as the case may be, though admittedly such intuitions play a role in the partiality of every research (Latour 2005, Labov 1984). The first sections of this chapter will cover the six ideologies listed – Zionism, Securitism, Resilience, Palestinian nationalism, Consumerism and Sexism. To show how the method may be applied to new language material, the final section will inverse the logical sequence in order to analyse inductively. An analysis will be offered of spoken instances of the twice-borrowed items *ḥabībī* (in the Arabic pronunciation) and *ḥabibi* (in the Modern Hebrew pronunciation) with fluid meanings starting with “darling” and “friend”, and followed by many shades of depreciation until reaching a patronising insult to an “adversary”. The conclusion will expand on why such an ideological framework is necessary both to situate past research and to open spaces for further work.

Zionism

Since its formulations in the course of the 19th century, in line with European nationalist ideologies of the time, Zionism has advocated collective emancipation for European Jewry, which in the event advanced a colonial-type project on lands and people in Palestine (Masalha 2014). The effects of Zionism on early Hebrew-Arabic contact reflect these two aspects. Most research has focused on two areas of contact: disagreements among specialised Hebrew “revivalists” in the early 20th century over drawing on Arabic for lexical innovations, and, later, borrowings from Palestinian Arabic for slang, particularly in the Jewish paramilitaries.

The debate among Hebrew “revivalists” echoed the arguments between linguistic comparativists (exemplified by Eliezer Ben Yehuda, who drew on Arabic as a source of neologisms) and philologists (the Hebrew Academy that preferred the Judaeo-Aramaic of a mythologised Jewish past) that were ongoing among European linguists since the 18th century (Newmeyer 1988). Both strands shared the assumption that language is formative of culture and therefore must be prescribed for a Hebrew national culture to emerge. The Academy rejected Arabic as a language of an “inferior culture” (Kuzar 2001). More recent research has showed that European languages that were the first Hebrew “revivalists’” native tongues provided some of the grammatical structure of Modern Hebrew (Kahn 2009), and that some of the new Arabic- or Aramaic-inspired lexicon spread successfully precisely because it phonetically echoed semantically similar European words (Zuckermann 2006). Paradoxically, the Arabic borrowings were deemed *essentially* Semitic and yet *sounded* European, similarly to the way Zionism, in reaction to European anti-Semitism, formed some Jewish Europeans to be distinctively “Hebrew” yet participants in European movements and ideas. The neologisms also had to fit into the grammatical structures the migrants brought with them from their native languages, much in the way the settlers installed their political structures in Palestine, experienced by the Palestinians and other local Arabs as a settler-colonial project.

The Zionist paramilitaries, and in particular the Palmakh (a Hebrew acronym for a phrase that literally means “crushing troops”), found another point of articulation with the practice of borrowing from Arabic. The slang terms they favoured are, on the face of it, attitudinally in opposition to those that were institutionally sanctioned by the early “revivalists”. They appealed to Palmakhniks as discourse markers precisely because they retained a recognisable degree of Arabic resonance that gave the paramilitaries the trappings of authenticity (Lacoste et al. 2014) by reference to those who were truly indigenous to the land that the settlers were taking over (Levy 2013). Arabic insults and colloquialisms were used to plug a lexical gap that the official Hebrew institutions would not fill, and moreover were better placed to do so than what was already available to the first Modern Hebrew speakers in Yiddish or Russian (Masson 1986) because this usage conformed with a particular resolution to the Zionist settlers’ experience of emancipating oneself *from Europe* (and therefore discarding European languages) and creating a dominating force *in Palestine* (and therefore needing to devalue and appropriate some Arabic). These notional contradictions are, however, seamlessly wedded in the linguistic practices, for instance in Ariel Sharon’s speech in 1982 to a group of American Jewish leaders: “I am a farmer. I speak *dugri*.¹ I want a hundred thousand Jews demonstrating in front of the White House” (Katriel 1986: 31). This communicates the orientalist idea (Khazzoom 2003) that the Arab peasant, in Palmakh slang rendered by the term *falah* (borrowed from Arabic *fallāḥ* “peasant”), “naturally” living off the land, would communicate honest authenticity (Katriel 1986).

Once the State of Israel was established, another linguistic exercise took place rapidly: the erasure of Arabic topographic names, especially of those locales from which Palestinians

were expelled in the Nakba of 1948–52 (Suleiman 2004; Peteet 2005), and their replacement with Hebraised forms. At the same time, the Palestinian and other Arab population remaining in Israel gradually learnt to become bilingual in Arabic and Hebrew, while Jewish immigrants became monolingual in Modern Hebrew within the course of one or two generations. One casualty of those years was the pre-Zionism Yiddish of Palestine, in which Hebrew and Arabic borrowings had mixed (Kosover 1966), and other languages spoken by Jews in the first half of the 20th century (Halperin 2015), the contraction of which made Modern Hebrew the uncontested dominant language (for detail, see Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). In this context, the maintaining of Arabic as one of two official languages after 1948 was not a liberal “anomaly” that was sporadically implemented (Mendel et al. 2016; Deutch 2005); rather, it was a continuation of the one-nation-one-language equation. The Palestinians and other Arabs could not be admitted into the Jewish Israeli nation, whereas the Arab Jews could. For this reason, the Palestinians and other Arabs had to be given a separate one-nation-one-language, manifest in official Arabic. This status was not established in order to enable liberal diversity, as seen in the fact that the domains for Arabic use by Arab Jews contracted, but rather to maintain a certain coherence between Zionism and its language ideology, Hebrew monolingualism. It was not conceivable, in 1948, that the state of Israel could have only one official language, Hebrew, when it contained both a nation and a national “minority”. The “minority” had to be directed to its own official language so that it would not be assimilated into the other nation.

The enduring relevance of some forms of Zionism is manifest in the continuation of some of these linguistic practices. Many of the Arabic-based neologisms introduced by Ben Yehuda are in use today, as are insults and slang terms that are marked as Arabic, and the implanted place names are in common use by all except for self-conscious activists who seek to bear witness to the ethnic cleansing that accompanied the establishment of the state (Pappé 2006; Khalidi 1988). And, in July 2018, legislation was passed by the Israeli parliament that demoted Arabic from official (albeit suppressed) to “language with special status”.² Seventy years after the founding of Israel, the advocates of its state-centred Zionist ideology could not tolerate even the liberal potential of acknowledging the existence of a linguistic minority.

Securitism

Since the 1967 war, Zionism has differentiated more acutely between liberals and socialists on the one hand and ultra-nationalists on the other, with the latter claiming the mantle of “true” Zionism against which the other streams measure themselves. This has resulted in Zionism ceding the ideological mainstream to Securitism, the idea that military supremacy is the paramount concern of social, political and economic institutions in Israel (Kimmerling 2005). The Israeli media and public adopted terms that were first used by military spokespeople, such as *hudna* (<Arabic *hudna* “truce”), *intifada* (<Arabic *intifāda* “uprising”), *nakba* “catastrophe” (referring to the ethnic cleaning in the aftermath of the 1948 war) and *tahdiya* (<Arabic *tahdi'a* “ceasefire”) (Haaretz 2015b; Zochrot 2015). Critical discourse analysts have seen parallel uses of the word *jihad* (<Arabic *jihad* “struggle”) in US political speeches, denoting a specifically Muslim type of violence (Jackson 2007).

On the Arabic side, Securitism also impacted one of the semantic types of vocabulary borrowed from Hebrew, much of which relates to military procedures in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The physical realities of checkpoints, and their name in Palestinian speech, *maḥsōm* (<Modern Hebrew *maḥsom*), which has acquired an Arabic broken plural form *maḥasīm*, are products of the Israeli ideology, and attendant practices, of Securitism (Hawker 2013).

Resilience

Most Palestinian and other Arab citizens of Israel are competent to some degree in Hebrew as well as their native dialects of Arabic, and this is taken for granted by speakers of the hegemonic Hebrew (Suleiman 2018). In the figurative sociolinguistic market (Bourdieu 1982), Hebrew monolingualism is the prize, while multilingualism is the depreciated function of “minorities”. What is publicly commented upon by Jewish Israeli cultural figures are the high levels of Hebrew proficiency and idiomaticity of Palestinian public figures such as writers Anton Shammas and Sayed Kashua, broadcaster Lucy Aharish and broadcaster-cum-politician Zuheir Bahloul (Hever & Gensler 1987; Talmon 2000; Shimony 2013; Hawker 2019). The effect of Hebrew hegemony on Palestinian and other Arab citizens’ language practices – bilingualism and in some cases deliberate eloquence cultivated as double monolingualism – is articulated with Zionism. The framework offered here allows us to move away from relating these particular practices, and all contact-induced phenomena, to the judgement of the essential or fluid nature of the speakers’ *identity*, which is defined as ethnic (Frello 2014). The pitfall of such an approach would be to herald the emergence of some sort of hybrid “post-Zionist” identities (Hever 2012; Brennan & Bhabha 1990). It is pertinent to dispute here, as others have elsewhere (Hardt & Negri 2009), whether the idea of post-colonial hybridity masks ongoing neo-colonial processes.

Rather, we are offering a framework within which *identity* is not called in question, but *ideology* is. This is not to say, simplistically, that those Palestinians and other Arabs who speak Modern Hebrew well are Zionist, leading to the speculation that Hebrew proficiency could be a political liability for Arabic speakers to be masked, for instance, with the cultivation of an Arabic accent. The argument goes as follows: Palestinian and other Arab citizens of Israel have borne the brunt of thinking about and with Zionism, both experientially through the official justification for the expulsions in 1948–52, the politics of land expropriation and other policies, and through the Israeli education system (Abu-Saad 2006). They can accurately be described as having been interpellated by Zionism (in the way a police officer can address a citizen “Hey, you!” (Althusser 2006)). Zionism has constituted their habitus. They react in a variety of ways, for instance by adapting to the dominant status of Hebrew in public Israeli life and also by challenging its exclusive hegemony (Hawker 2019). Bluntly put, Palestinians’ and other Arabs’ ability to develop their multilingualism in reaction to the marginalisation of Arabic in Israel rests on the interpellation of another ideology: Palestinian resilience.

“Resilience” is a trope of Palestinian nationalist rhetoric, which elevates *ṣumūd* – usually translated as “steadfastness”, portrayed as the determination to remain on the land claimed for Palestine, or to retain Palestinian refugee status, or even simply to call oneself Palestinian – to an act of resistance against relentless Israeli efforts to suppress Palestinian existence (Harker 2012; Allen 2008). I have chosen the term “resilience” over “steadfastness” in order to keep a distance from the nationalist trope while referencing it, and to connote the senses of effort, resignation and pragmatism associated with resilience. Nowhere are these contradictions more obvious than in the language practices of Palestinian day-migrant workers from the Occupied Palestinian Territories who are or were employed in Israel.

Code alternation, in which one language is used at work and another at home, is at present the only acceptable linguistic behaviour for the Palestinian day-migrant workers within the existing relations of power, both vis-à-vis the Israeli employers and vis-à-vis the Palestinian communities they live in. The workers must know at least some Hebrew to understand instructions and retain their jobs, and they have been willing to accept discriminatory terms of employment and lack of socioeconomic mobility (Farsakh 2005). The borrowing that captures

this ideological view best is *matana*, which is Hebrew for “gift”, but when used by Palestinian workers, refers to a small annual bonus which they take as an indication of the Israeli employer’s generosity (Hawker 2013).

Palestinian nationalism

Scholars of Arabic in Israel founded the Arabic Language Academy in Haifa in 2007, in part to resist the interference of Hebrew in Palestinian Arabic (Amara 2010; Kayyal 2011). Other normative campaigns against Hebrew uses by Arabs include that of The League in Jaffa, which likens the linguistic “interference” to the “encroachment” of Jewish-only housing projects in this town (League of the Arabs of Jaffa 2014). In this context, reports of the spread of a new variety of Arabic in Israel named ‘Arabrāni or ‘Arabrīyya, rendered as “Arabrew” in English, heavily influenced by Modern Hebrew and qualitatively different from Arabic dialects elsewhere, is seen as “treasonous”, or a manifestation of a “Zionist conspiracy” (Hawker 2018a).

These reports appear to be confirmed by research into language practices of Palestinian and other Arab citizens of Israel (Amara 1999; Isleem 2013, 2015; Mar’i 2013; Spolsky 1997). A study conducted in 1992 compared Hebrew use in a divided West Bank Palestinian village: one half came under Jordanian administration in 1950, while the other became part of Israel. Villagers on the Israeli side of the border, which had been closed from 1949 to 1967, then open from 1967 to 1987, and much more closely controlled ever since, used more Hebrew in sociolinguistic interviews and were less likely to tick the box marked “Palestinian” in a survey than their counterparts on the eastern side of the border. The authors of the study consider borrowing Hebrew a manifestation of the speakers’ “Israeli” identity, and in turn consider this to be causal in the political action of not participating in the First Intifada (Amara & Spolsky 2001: 273–288). Regardless of the possible flaws of the study, including disregard for the political contexts of the questions asked in the interviews and surveys, the explicit causality deduced from the results assumes an articulation of language practices with levels of Palestinian nationalist sentiment, while the contention of this chapter is that Palestinian nationalism is but one of several ideologies that guide the tendencies of the various language practices, and that Resilience and Consumerism should be considered as operative as well.

Martin Isleem focused on the Hebrew influence on speech in Druze-majority towns inside Israel, and another recent study has found that among a group of university students, those from the Druze community were more likely to use Hebrew codeswitching than other Arab communities, which in the study are defined by faith, which maps onto the state Population Registry’s categories on identity records (Rosenhouse & Brand 2016). Other studies have studied Circassian communities (Kreindler et al. 1995) and others the integration of Hebrew loanwords in Arabic (Koplewitz 1990; Laks 2015). Within the framework of this chapter, it is not only unnecessary to distinguish sub-groups of Arabic speakers in Israel by religious or ethnographic marker (which carries legal consequences in the form of the entry in the Population Registry; see Zureik, Lyon & Abu-Laban 2010), but also ethically and factually questionable, since most recent work on identity in Israel/Palestine finds that the various identities are nested and cumulative (as opposed to parallel and singular), flexible and negotiated in interaction (Rouhana 1997). In the absence of a theory of performativity, the correlation between legal identity category and Hebrew contact practices provides a deterministic explanation. The determinism leads to the stigmatisation of speakers or communities who speak Arabic with any traces of Hebrew, from the point of view of nationalist ideology: hence the pejorative “Arabrew”. Instead, I propose to view language practices – in these studies, the propensity to codeswitch with Hebrew – as articulated with several ideologies. The advantage of this

conception is the increased nuance necessary to understand a multi-causal and changing situation, which may well be inflected by the legal status of speakers in the Israeli state as one of several factors.

Roni Henkin has documented current linguistic practices of the Bedouin in the Naqab/Negev, including those resulting from contact with Hebrew (Henkin 2009, 2011). Henkin discerns that the functions of Hebrew are multifarious: borrowings relate to workplace technology, state services and security bodies, and Israeli products. Hebrew items can also denote youthful slang (Henkin-Roitfarb 2011: 85–87), and can be used for humour, or to show off one's professional understanding of Israeli procedures from the point of view of a "veteran of the system" (Henkin 2009: 184). These types of borrowings or discourse markers are similar to those found in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Hawker 2013). These language practices are to be expected in any contact situation and do not amount to a new dialectal variety, specific to Arabic speakers inside Israel, worthy of its own name (Hawker 2018a).

The paradoxes of Palestinian nationalism as a purist language ideology are manifest in the use of Hebrew for ironic humour (Henkin 2009; Hawker 2013). Arabic speakers can resort to Hebrew borrowings or codeswitching to tell jokes that take a dig at what they perceive as stereotypical Israeli attributes such as rudeness or bossiness (Hawker 2018b). On a bus ride from Beit Jala to East Jerusalem in the West Bank in December 2014, the Palestinian driver swore in Hebrew (transcribed below in regular font) with some Arabic (in italics) at an Israeli driver who had abruptly cut in front of the bus in order to pull over and let off passengers: "t'atsor b'ēmtsa ha tsōmet, *ya ḥmār!*" ("You stop in the middle of the crossroads, *you donkey!*") After a pause the driver then repeated the insult with a variation to give an additional connotation of Israeliness to "the donkey": "*ya ḥmār!*" The joke plays on the stereotypical rendition by Jewish Israelis of the Arabic phoneme /h/ as [x]. Israeliness, as prejudice would have it, was the butt of the joke, voicing reckless driving through phonetics, and was appreciated by the passengers in the bus, as observed by the author of this chapter.

Consumerism

Jean Baudrillard identified constant systemic dissatisfaction as the driving force of the capitalist economy in which growth relies on increasing consumption. It is not material comfort that "stupefies" (Marcuse 2013), but the incessant need to acquire more consumer goods functioning as status symbols that does so (Baudrillard 1998). Purchasing ever-new products for display is now considered commonplace to great numbers of people at all levels of society in many parts of the world, and powerful institutions encourage this activity. Though consumption is a mass phenomenon, the ideology promotes it as the pursuit of individualistic self-fulfilment. It is this aspect that stands in practical contradiction to both Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, which demand collective self-determination and which would blame Consumerism for the lack of nationalist commitment (not to say "stupefaction") of their constituencies. It is indicative of this, nationalists would argue, that posters relaying an oral history project on "everyday life" of Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel in the 1950s, avoiding politically contested issues, were exhibited in June 2015 in a "shopping mall" – commonly referred to in local Arabic by its Hebrew term, *kenyon* – in Kfar Saba in central Israel (Haaretz 2015a; Haj Yehia & Lev Tov 2015).

Studies of the linguistic correlate of Consumerism as a global trend have noted the role of English codeswitching as a discourse marker signalling adherence to Consumerism (Besnier 2004). Palestinians, like Israelis, are attracted to the "good life" on display in Israeli shopping centres, in entertainment venues and on the beaches (Carmeli & Applbaum 2004), and mixing

Hebrew in Arabic speech is an affordable indicator of aspirations to such a lifestyle. Many of the borrowed Hebrew items listed in Abd el-Rahman Mar'i's work (2013) on the Arabic of citizens of Israel fall within that functional category. The propensity of some respondents in Uri Horesh's study (2015) of variation in Jaffa Arabic to "soften" their pronunciation of pharyngeals and emphatics appears to be linked to their frequenting the "modern" consumerist lifestyle available in nearby Tel Aviv, as well as the expansion of Consumerism into Jaffa through the influx of Jewish Israeli shoppers seeking goods and services that are cheaper there than in Tel Aviv and its other suburbs.

The idea that languages of "modernity" are apolitical, and their adoption a necessary evolutionary step from pre-modernity, and therefore a "rational choice" (Williams 1992) for speakers of languages associated with economically less developed communities (Coulmas 1992) has a longer history than its latest incarnation in Consumerism. In 1973, less than six years after the Israeli army occupied the West Bank (though this context is not mentioned in the study), linguists from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem conducted research into the connotations of Hebrew and Arabic for Palestinian men from Jericho in the West Bank (Cooper et al. 1977). Hebrew was thought to be associated with science, while Arabic was thought to be associated with Islamic morality. In an experiment, the design of which would be considered flawed by today's standards, arguments for avoiding smoking and drinking were found to be judged as persuasive by the respondents when there was a fit between the arguments, the language they were presented in, and the presumed connotations of that language. The study itself appears to be unaware that its premises are informed by Zionist tenets that conferred legitimacy to the appropriation of Palestinian land on the grounds that the indigenous inhabitants would not make good use of the resources and would indeed benefit from modernity developed by Zionists (Efron 2011).

Yet in the framework of this chapter, while I hope to be more aware of relations of power than the authors of the Jericho study, I see resonances of its assumptions in the fact that the Arabic Language Academy in Haifa issues bulletins with Arabic translations for Hebrew scientific terms. It confirms that the Academy perceives a link between Hebrew and a specific model of modernity, and want to instruct Palestinian researchers to use linguistic substitutes which articulate with Palestinian nationalism within the same modern world (Arabic Language Academy 2009, 2013). I propose that modernity presents itself to many people not as scientific discoveries analysed by nationally minded intellectuals in learned competition with one another, but as consumerist temptations. The salient aspect of an Israeli, Hebrew-speaking experience of modernity to be emulated is Consumerism, signalled by Palestinians answering, for instance, *bsēder* (<Hebrew *beséder* "OK") to the question *kīf ḥālak* (Levantine Arabic for "how are you?"). The escape offered from the ethno-nationalist categories in conflict, and from securitist constrictions, is Consumerism, not postmodern fluid and hybrid identity (Sa'ar 2004).

Sexism

By now it should be clear that my treatment of ideology does not view each one listed, named and defined so categorically, as impermeable. The six ways of understanding the experienced world are distinguished here as a matter of analytical convenience which leads to explanatory simplification. Since Sexism permeates in various ways most of the other five ideologies, this section will deliberately complicate the picture. Erez Levon has argued (2009) that the Palmakh combatants' speech, identified with early Zionism as part of its emancipation from the image of the "weak" European Jew, and described by Katriel as *dugri* talk (*dugri*, borrowed

from Arabic *duġri*, originally from Turkish *dogru* “straightforward”), has formed the masculine low-pitched voice lacking features of negative politeness that is still prevalent. Interestingly for the subject of this chapter, Levon notes that when questioned on topics relating to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, gay men lowered the pitch of their voice, which he interprets as signalling identification with the masculine heterosexual norm and ultimately with Zionism. Palestinian nationalism (with masculine connotations) and Resilience (feminine) are similarly stereotypically gendered (Peteet 2013).

Securitism and Consumerism are *the* hegemonic ideologies that articulate with power dynamics in the region and globally. Securitism requires that priority in allocation of resources must be given to maintaining military might in a totally mobilised and surveilled society without distinction of frontline and home front (Zureik et al. 2010). In Zionism, the frontline was the masculine protection for the feminine home front. To clarify the differences between Securitism and Zionism (which overlap in the real-world consequences for the military control of the Occupied Palestinian Territories), a hypothetical critical question regarding Securitism – posed from the point of view of Zionism – could ask how much resource can be diverted from “home front” concerns such as education and welfare before the “home front” becomes not worth protecting (Kimmerling 2005). The hypothetical answer will distract from the lack of resources for education and welfare with the attraction of Consumerism. The Israeli military itself does not expect – as Zionism did – collective “sacrifice” on the national altar, but rather appeals to individual career prospects in enterprises such as “start-ups” in security technology (Senor & Singer 2011).

Consumerism appears to trigger changes in norms regarding gendered behaviours, for instance, in the acceptability of women leaving the home domain for leisure (Sa’ar 2004). Lack of access to other sources of social status (West & Zimmerman 1987) is compensated for by Consumerism available to politically and educationally disenfranchised groups in the context of widening wealth gaps. I propose that the language practices articulated with Securitism and Consumerism would benefit from further research with a question on whether contested gendered power relations affect which Arabic speakers will resort to *maḥsōm* (in articulation with Securitism) or *bsēder* (with Consumerism) and be perceived equivalently (Gökariksel and McLarney, Ellen 2010).

My darling – my adversary: *ḥabībī/ḥabībi*

On this occasion, the borrowing language returned the item with a little wear and tear. Palestinians and other Arabic speakers use *ḥabībī* (“my darling” masc.) and *ḥabībti* (fem.) as terms of affection both among equals and in familial relationships. Another native use of the term *ḥabībī* – but not *ḥabībti* – was attested by a speaker from Gaza who reported the following exchange (judged plausible by other Palestinians)³ with a merchant in a market in which the customer questions the price of a product:

CUSTOMER: *lēš gāli la ha d-daraġe?*

“Why is it so expensive?”

MERCHANT: *hād miš muzayyaf ya ḥabībī, hādi mārka.*

“This isn’t fake, ḥabībī, this is the original brand.”

The respondent found this form of address insulting. Another example in the same vein relates to being addressed in a group discussion, when a disagreement is brewing, *zakkirni bi-’ismak ḥabībī?* meaning “What’s your name again *ḥabībī?*”. According to another Palestinian

respondent, a plausible retort to such a slight would be to say *mā tihkīli ḥabībi* (“don’t call me *ḥabībi*”).⁴ It is only with this meaning of passive-aggressive insult that *ḥabībi* was borrowed into Hebrew, whilst undergoing a slight phonetic change.

A collection of Palmakh anecdotes gives an idea of the possible early uses of the borrowing. In the anecdote ironically titled “A volunteer”, a Palmakh combatant nicknamed “Abu Lesh”, to connote local “Arab-like” familiarity, complains to his commander that he is bored of working in the vegetable garden and wants to go into military action:

šma ḥabībi ’o še ’ata motsi ’oti le pe’ula ’o še ’ani yotse me ha palmaḥ be hitnadvut.

“Listen, *ḥabībi*, either you give me leave to go into action or I leave the Palmakh voluntarily.”

(Ben-Amotz & Chefer 1956: 44)

In the anecdote “A little exercise”, another Palmakh combatant who is reputed to be one of the strongest and most cool-headed (“arms of iron and nerves of steel”) is asked to be the object of a demonstration of judo moves. After a while he tells the trainer:

dayy ḥabībi šavarta li ’et ha yad.

“Enough, *ḥabībi*, you’ve broken my arm.”

(Ben-Amotz & Chefer 1956: 75; translations for this chapter by N. Hawker)

One of the authors of the collection, Dan Ben-Amotz, who was born in Poland and who became a journalist, is credited with propagating the image, seen by more subtle witnesses of the time as a sexist caricature (Raziel-Jackont 1980), of the Zionist pioneer. This borrowing is still in use in Modern Israeli Hebrew slang today, as are other borrowings from Arabic (Gafer & Horesh 2015). Typical usage is exemplified by this exchange between an Israeli police officer and an Israeli taxi driver: *tīšma ḥabībi mašehu po lo beseder* for “Listen up, *ḥabībi*, something here isn’t right” (Hawker 2013). This usage is so commonplace that an Israeli respondent was surprised that *ḥabībi* does function in Arabic as a real term of endearment between lovers.⁵ Yonatan Mendel has documented and analysed how the military uses of Arabic have permeated the Jewish Israeli education system with regards to Arabic instruction (Mendel 2014).

During the 1970s in Israel, the wave of Jewish immigration from Arab countries over the previous two decades expressed itself culturally in the popularity of “Mizrahi” (literally, “Eastern”) music. The pop singers who became the stars of this genre sang in Hebrew but retained Arabic pronunciation of what for them was not a borrowing of *ḥabībī* and *ḥabībti*, but a re-situating of their native language (Shohat 2003). They were preserving sensual connotations that come with an Orientalist view of Arabic (Abu-Lughod 2001). Also on the music scene, “world” and “indie” styles continued to use this word also in the forms of *ḥabībi* and even *ḥabībti* in the rendition of bands such as the *ḥabībti ansāmbəl*, which currently performs in Israel and introduces its web page with Hebrew slang borrowed from Arabic, *mabsut?* (<Arabic *mabsūt*) meaning “happy?”, but with no other apparent connection to Arabic other than a quest for social media trending (Facebook 2015). In late capitalist market dynamics, linguistic products that rely on ethnic stereotyping are re-packaged as commodities.

Israelis’ professed inability to pronounce [h] is a source of humour for Palestinians, as seen above under Palestinian nationalism, when Arabic speakers mock the Israeli pronunciation /h/ ([x]). The humour is all the more stinging in the case of *ḥabībi* because it is, of course, originally an Arabic word, borrowed into Hebrew, and then taken back to use against Israelis.

It continues to carry the insulting connotations that the Arabic *ḥabībī* can have, but because it is humorous it deflects the butt of the joke away from the concrete addressee and to the abstract target, Israeliness. Here I am leaning on a Bakhtinian commentary on the parodic genre, according to which parody is always “double voiced”, and thus containing a “hidden polemic” that mocks as well as displays knowledge of the authority that is being parodied (Bakhtin 1994: 202). It is aggressive but does not offend, as seen in this example from an Arabic-speaking communal dinner in the West Bank, at which a Palestinian man asks a friend for coffee and parodies supposedly Israeli rude manners by doing so in Hebrew:

efo ha kafe ḥabibi? aḥarey oḥel tsariḥ kafe.

“Where’s the coffee ḥabibi? After a meal one needs coffee.”

(*Hawker 2013*)

I deduce from this evidence and from other sources (Gaftar & Horesh 2015) that the phonemic pair *ḥ/ḥ* creates social meanings and stances on the Arabic/Hebrew interface, manifest in the depreciation of Arabic, the mocking of Hebrew, or the commodification of “Orientalness” as the orders of indexicality progress and combine relationally (Di Carlo 2016). In terms of language ideology, the pair *ḥ/ḥ* is formed into an icon of differentiation which can be claimed and used by speakers of both Hebrew and Arabic, but not to signal national affiliation per se. Rather, the icon signals meanings and stances linked to a range of political ideologies: *ḥabībī/ḥabibi* is a satisfying example to deploy because we can trace its use by early Zionist activists such as Ben-Amotz, through the sexism of Orientalism, past the de-nationalised commodification of social media, and back to a Palestinian nationalism infused with bitter humour, while being aware of the benchmark meanings circled around by spontaneous uses of the word.

Conclusion

The overview of the literature was ordered by ideologies – Zionism, Securitism, Resilience, Palestinian nationalism, Consumerism, Sexism – that were posited as operative for explaining specific patterns of language practices as organised by the Palestine/Israel habitus. This is not to say that speech is shaped by powerful ideological forces to which social subjects submit unwittingly. Rather, the impact of ideologies on language practices is inevitable because of the twinned human capacities for speech and thought (Vygotsky 1962), but not in a specifically determined way, since thought is always manifest in practices. The analysis of the borrowings *ḥabībī/ḥabibi* shows that several ideologies can articulate with language practices that look superficially similar, and that an ideology’s interpellation of social subjects can trigger a range of practices, which in turn form experiences which foster ideas.

The criticisms that have been levelled at Critical Discourse Analysis will come to the minds of those sceptical of the interpellation of *ideologies*: the material basis is both too broad and generalised (sections 1–6) and too narrow and specific (section 7) to make the framework stand up. Where possible, I have addressed the first concern by referring to detailed studies that document the language practices articulating with the ideologies highlighted; I have included all the studies of Arabic-Hebrew contact phenomena that I am aware of in order to avoid the pitfalls of selectiveness; and where I could not find any studies of practices that are known to have occurred or to be underway, I am offering this space for the situating of future research. Moreover, my ambition is not to uncover what ideological power games are being played by institutions through the language practices they propagate – though the political need for this is clear – but rather to open the “black box” of the link between speaking and

thinking by showing how variations in ways of speaking articulate with different ways of thinking about the world as exemplified by language practices and ideologies in our emblematic case of Israel and Palestine.

The dominant conceptual paradigm ties the phenomena of language contact to challenges to the mutually exclusive national identities of the speakers. These power vectors are recognised, made intelligible ideologically, and they inform our academic field and not only the linguistic material we study. The depth of the roots of the one-nation-one-language equation, as applied in policy, reflected in norms and emically understood by Arabic and Hebrew speakers, is acknowledged inasmuch as this chapter refers to contact phenomena as occurring between two bounded codes, rather than as fluid translanguaging. Nevertheless, that equation ought to be broken, at least in academic research. Tethering language practices to identities, which in the Israeli and Palestinian contexts are overdetermined by nationalism, oppressive policies and conflict, closes down the critical potential of sociolinguistics. The hope is that researchers will find the proposed approach to be a productive framework for further work.

Notes

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- 1 Arabic /duyri/ “straight”; *I speak dugri* “I speak brutally honestly”. Translation by the author.
 - 2 Records no. 2743, Ministry of Justice, The Book of Laws, 26 July 2018, Basic Law: Israel – The Nation-State of the Jewish People *החוק היסודי: ישראל מדינת הלאום של העם היהודי*, p. 1, translation by the author.
 - 3 The author thanks unnamed reviewers for these insights.
 - 4 As observed by a Palestinian reviewer of a draft of this chapter – with thanks from the author.
 - 5 As observed by an Israeli reviewer of a draft of this chapter – with thanks from the author.

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