


This article was downloaded by: 10.2.97.136

On: 22 Mar 2023

Access details: *subscription number*

Publisher: *Routledge*

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK



## The Routledge Handbook of German Politics & Culture

Sarah Colvin, Mark Taplin

### Germany as Kulturnation

Publication details

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315747040.ch13>

Wilfried van der Will, Rob Burns

**Published online on: 08 Dec 2014**

**How to cite :-** Wilfried van der Will, Rob Burns. 08 Dec 2014, *Germany as Kulturnation from: The Routledge Handbook of German Politics & Culture* Routledge

Accessed on: 22 Mar 2023

<https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315747040.ch13>

**PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT**

Full terms and conditions of use: <https://test.routledgehandbooks.com/legal-notices/terms>

This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

# Germany as *Kulturnation*

## Identity in diversity?

Wilfried van der Will and Rob Burns

---

### The reach of cultural policy

This chapter addresses the nature and structure of contemporary cultural politics in Germany. Cultural politics is a field of political practice rarely analysed by scholars of cultural studies either in Germany or in English-speaking countries.<sup>1</sup> This is surprising, first, because culture, elite and popular, is gaining media attention relative to economics and politics; second, because of the extensive private sponsorship and support from the public purse that culture receives, not to mention the provision for administrative and policymaker posts throughout Germany at local, subregional, regional, state (*Land*), and Federal level; and third, because of the increasing cultural activity at all these levels, where individual, small-group, or grassroots initiatives find material support by the official administration and/or private foundations.

Our way of life is deeply affected by technologies of global communication, but culture as the sum of our lived practices cannot be divorced from its enactment in the specificity of time and space. It does not have to take place within the framework of an administered policy. Culture may be understood as a lived practice by individuals and collectives within accepted cognitive systems such as religions, ideologies, and creeds. It may also be seen as an ensemble of attitudes and habits with which human beings realise and regulate their interaction with others. The geographically variant patterns of persistence and change of customs, beliefs, values, languages, and traditions fascinated Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), whose thought is still regularly referred to in the German debate about culture (see Chapter 2). Although his concept of culture was based on the homogeneity of an ethnically and linguistically unified people, he does allow for transcultural and intercultural inspiration between people from different backgrounds. Like many other nations, Germany today is not only made up of distinct regions but also contains within it minority cultures from many parts of the world. It is therefore a playground for cultural enrichment through the incorporation of diverse traditions, but also a society that needs the management of tensions between diverse cultural manifestations and lifestyles existing in close proximity to one another.

Unlike the feudal-absolutist states of the 18th century (Herder's political environment) or the dictatorships of the 20th, the highly evolved forms of contemporary governance have to strike a delicate balance between neutrally supporting culture and giving it a politically desired

direction from above. The democratically legitimated state as a system exercising and controlling power seeks to categorise individual and collective practices, including the arts. To reach an audience, artists must constitute themselves as a social presence. A writer makes use of the printed word as a basic medium to find a public, a dramatist uses the stage, a composer requires soloists and an orchestra, a painter needs canvas and an exhibition space, and so on. Even a liberal and relatively affluent state like contemporary Germany will confront the question which creative activities are to be regarded as beneficial and which are not, which might be eligible for public financial support and which should not. Such decisions take place within a wider constitutional framework. Like the First Amendment in the USA, Article 5 of the constitution of the Federal Republic or Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), apart from affirming the right to free expression, explicitly declares: 'There shall be no censorship.' Citizens can therefore have guaranteed freedoms enforced by the courts. Beyond this there is an institutionally distinct structure of cultural administration and policy-making, regionally divided but federally coordinated. Its existence is the *de facto* recognition that culture is an essential part of the way that German society expresses and understands itself. Private initiatives and patronage bolster cultural pursuits further.

The brief of the cultural administrator in Germany is spatially limited by region and locality. The intentions governing these agents' activities are to be supportive, encouraging, and explorative. In response to the complex contemporary environment in which they operate, those working in the field of culture have to adapt to social change and be aware of the plurality of issues arising within and between different social milieus. For example, there is a marked trend towards secularisation (see Chapter 15). According to long-term research on religious orientation, the percentage of those professing allegiance to the Christian faith has fallen in Germany from over 90 per cent in 1970 to below 60 per cent in 2010 (*Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauungen in Deutschland 2011*). Also, the number of citizens with a migration background living in Germany is 7.2 million, with Turks representing the largest grouping. In addition to differences in religious and secular beliefs, there are those of social class, education, and ethnic origin. Such factors raise the question how all these diverse social groups might be made part of a society's self-expression and self-representation. Cultural policy is consciously pursued to allow representations of difference by culturally and/or ethnically distinct communities. At the same time, education, celebratory events, the practice of regional and local customs, festivities, and carnivals are used to strengthen social cohesion.

Despite the abundance and distinctiveness of cultural theories that have been elaborated to date,<sup>2</sup> most share a critique of (post)modern culture as an apparatus for incorporating individuals into existing power structures. Against this generalising assumption, most cultural policymakers would insist that there is enough room left for individuals and groups to generate or absorb meanings autonomously and freely. After all, democratic systems claim to allow for the free expression of diverse lifestyles. Any critical examination of cultural policy must query the extent to which this claim is true and to what extent it may be a delusion. Just as freedom of choice in a consumer society hides the limitations of choice if the market is controlled by monopoly suppliers, so the cultural events on offer may only conspire to keep the population quiet. In ancient Rome, rulers mollified the masses by giving them free bread and circuses in architecturally imposing colosseums. Faced with capitalist societies in the 1930s and 1940s dominated by the concentration of intellectual production in a few monopoly publishing concerns, the influential critical thinker Theodor W. Adorno spoke of a 'culture industry' that practised 'enlightenment as mass deception' (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979: 120). Adorno argued that individuals, trying to escape the drudgery of their lives, immersed themselves in an entertainment culture that robbed them of all sovereign thought. The images of motion pictures and the packaged amusements of the leisure industry only made individuals more easily accept the stereotypical patterns

of their existence. By making use of the facilities for aesthetic mass consumption (particularly in advertising, cinema, and illustrated magazines) modern human beings were busy internalising passive behaviour that eroded their self-confidence. Adorno's relentlessly negative analysis, which has produced many echoes in cultural theories to the present day, sought to expose hidden interests in popular culture that resist exposure in public discourse and hence stay hidden to those engulfed by them.

Against an entirely pessimistic reading along these lines it is possible to argue that, partly because of the force of Adorno's influence on younger generations of intellectuals, there is now a continual struggle in public discourse to open up critical spaces. The more cultural theorists warn us of the potential confinement of human perception and creativity by manipulative media, the more these provoke the desire to resist their repressive hold. A democratic society is tested continually for its potential to remain open to oppositional forces. These may express themselves in literature and art, in spontaneous demonstrations, or in collective movements. At the same time, such forces are tested for their readiness to come to terms with existing power structures. Within the contradictory complexities of contemporary life, in which there is no central creed or ideology commanding unquestioned authority, individuals and groups looking for new identities and posing new questions are as endemic as the tendency to accept and conform to the given is widespread. The production of symbolic communication – political rhetoric and everyday language, literature, film, and art – cannot be controlled entirely by established power systems. After all, these are only as permanent as their legitimacy is felt to be acceptable by citizens. Democratic structures may serve as instruments of hidden or overt repression, but remain open to dialectical reversals by subversive or oppositional action. Many cultural theories exhort us to regard any structures in the deployment of power, be they political or cultural, traditional, or newly evolving, as a potential incarceration of human perception and creativity. However, the inspirational life of human beings is apt to test such structures for their rigidity or elasticity. Cultural policy is the attempt to manage this uncertain state of affairs, forever confronted with the basic contradiction of recognising creative freedom while at the same time containing it within the social order.

### **Cultural federalism: internal and external aspects**

Germany is an interesting case study because of its experience of, and exit from, two forms of totalitarianism in which culture was overtly controlled by a mix of centrally directed propaganda and terror. The Basic Law insists on the fundamental rights of citizens and thereby delimits the powers of the state. The second foundational element for contemporary Germany is federalism. After the defeat of the National Socialist regime, the Allied powers allowed the re-establishment of regional German states (Länder), which in turn decided to form the Federal Republic in the west of Germany. These appear at first glance to be shifts of a purely political nature; but there can be little doubt that culture is at the heart of Germany's self-definition. Casting aside any differences in socialisation, mentality, and everyday behaviour that had effectively arisen in the divided Germany before 1989, Article 35, §1 of the German Unification Treaty (31 August 1990) averred that art and culture had provided an element of continuing unity even while two German states existed. The political commitment to culture at all levels of governance is reflected in some detail in the voluminous report of 2007 by a committee of enquiry set up by the German Federal parliament (Bundestag). It categorically asserts: 'Culture is not an ornament. It is the foundation on which our society rests and on which it builds' ('Kultur ist kein Ornament. Sie ist das Fundament, auf dem unsere Gesellschaft steht und auf das sie baut') (Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 4). This report repeated the recommendation first formulated by an earlier commission

that culture should be defined in the German constitution as an aim, if not the *raison d'être* of the state (Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 69). There is certainly a sense that the cosmopolitanism that was betrayed by coercive totalitarian regimes ought to be reinstated in the cultural practices of a nation governed as a *Kulturstaat*. However, despite much pleading by representatives of all political parties to have the Basic Law amended, the inscription of culture as an aim of the Federal constitution continues to be resisted in order to avoid any suggestion of cultural centralism, while cultural practice and research into culture are to be expanded.<sup>3</sup>

The development of culture in the Federal Republic is predicated on structural specificities defined by the constitution, which assigns different tasks and responsibilities at three administrative levels: the Federal government, the Länder, and the municipalities. Article 30 of the Grundgesetz stipulates that 'the exercise of governmental powers and the discharge of governmental functions is the task of the Länder, except where otherwise provided for in this Basic Law'. From this unambiguous precept is derived the fundamental identity of the Länder as relatively independent states (*Eigenstaatlichkeit*) and, as an essential facet of that autonomy, their primacy in administering and legislating on cultural matters (*kulturelle Eigengesetzlichkeit*). The latter is commonly referred to as the 'cultural sovereignty' of the Länder (*Kulturhoheit der Länder*), a term regarded by some administrators as infelicitous on account of its associations with the pre-democratic, authoritarian state (*Obrigkeitsstaat*).<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the principle that concept embodies is jealously guarded, as the first Federal Commissioner for Culture and the Media, Michael Naumann, discovered when, barely two years after assuming office in 1998, he noted that 'cultural sovereignty' was nowhere to be found in the actual wording of the Basic Law and caused outrage in some quarters with his reference to the 'constitutional folklore' of cultural federalism (Naumann 2000). Although Naumann was technically correct, the term has frequently been deployed by the custodian of the constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the Länder's responsibility for art and culture represents a cornerstone of Germany's Federal system. As the individual constitutions of the Länder make clear, 'sovereignty' in this context betokens not an imperious presiding over culture 'from above' but rather its protection and promotion in the interests of the region's citizens.<sup>5</sup>

As critics had predicted, Naumann resigned shortly after his 'unfortunate witticism' (Geis 2001: 139), an indication of just how fiercely protective the Länder are of their cultural policy prerogative. Even before Naumann entered the fray, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's decision in 1998 to establish what amounted to a Federal ministry of culture<sup>6</sup> had met with vociferous opposition from the Länder, from all the political parties, and from the cultural pages of the broadsheets. Frank Schirrmacher, the influential literary editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, perceived in this move a regrettable tendency towards 'left-wing Wilhelminism'.<sup>7</sup> In fact, the slide into a 'unitary federal state' (Hesse 1982: 116) had already been detected by some observers in the early 1960s.<sup>8</sup> In contrast to the 'dual' or 'separative federalism' evinced by what is arguably the classic federalist model, developed in the United States, German politicians are committed to a system of 'cooperative federalism' in which the respective cultural responsibilities of the Länder and of central government are clearly demarcated, but without excluding opportunities for fruitful collaboration. There is an acknowledgement on the part of the Länder that (notwithstanding their 'cultural sovereignty') certain tasks properly fall within the remit of the Federal government – for example, the pursuit of foreign cultural policy or the promotion of German cinema internationally. A model of cooperation is provided by the Kulturstiftung der Länder, a foundation established in 1987 with the aim of supporting and preserving nationally and internationally valuable art and culture.<sup>9</sup> For Julian Nida-Rümelin, Naumann's successor, the provision of such support constituted one of two key areas in which the Federal Commissioner for Culture should play a decisive role. The other area he identified as advising

the government and liaising with parliament on matters relating to the legislative framework within which culture and cultural policy were to be shaped and developed (Nida-Rümelin 2001: 65).<sup>10</sup>

The efforts of Nida-Rümelin – who was to last even less time in the post than Naumann – to carve out a credible brief for his ministry were seen by the Länder as an attempted redefinition of the compact between national and regional remits in the field of culture and, as such, as something to be resisted. The balance in the division of power in cultural policy had already been disturbed by German unification in 1990, which took place only after the five Länder on the territory of the German Democratic Republic had been re-established so that, in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law, they could declare their readiness to join the Federal Republic on 3 October 1990. The new Länder boasted a wealth of artistic and cultural institutions and facilities that had been nurtured as an important heritage by the GDR regime. After 1990, continued funding from central government was justified with reference to Article 35, §1 of the Unification Treaty, which declared:

Art and culture [. . .] have an indispensable contribution to make in their own right as the Germans cement their unity in a single state on the path to European unification. The status and prestige of a united Germany in the world are predicated not only on its political weight and economic strength but equally on its role as a cultural state.

(Kunst und Kultur [. . .] leisten im Prozeß der staatlichen Einheit der Deutschen auf dem Weg zur europäischen Einigung einen eigenständigen und unverzichtbaren Beitrag. Stellung und Ansehen eines vereinten Deutschlands in der Welt hängen außer von seinem politischen Gewicht und seiner wirtschaftlichen Leistungskraft ebenso von seiner Bedeutung als Kulturstaat ab.)

Interpreted widely to mean that culture in the new Länder could not be allowed to wither on the vine of ‘cultural sovereignty’, this so-called ‘cultural state clause’ (*Kulturstaatsklausel*) entailed a recalibration of cultural federalism. The constitutional expert Peter Häberle (2001: 119) proposed the term ‘fiduciary federalism’ (*fiduziarischer Föderalismus*) to describe the act of solidarity that the Federal government and the old Länder temporarily had a duty to discharge towards the financially weaker new Länder. The temporary nature of this arrangement was open to question, however, for when the original ‘Solidarity Pact’<sup>11</sup> was revised in 2000 it was envisaged that the renewed agreement would run until 2019. Consequently the expanded role played by the Federal government on the cultural policy stage was to be more enduring than had been anticipated initially.

Nowhere was this interventionist role more apparent – or more resented in some quarters – than in the Federal government’s support for cultural amenities in Berlin. As one of Germany’s three city-states – a status it retained when, in a referendum held in May 1996, the citizens of Brandenburg voted by a large majority against merging their region with the city to form a new Land<sup>12</sup> – Berlin’s standing was, of course, irrevocably changed by the decision of the Federal parliament on 20 June 1991 to relocate the legislature and the government to the city and thus, as Bodo Mohrhäuser (1998: 135) subsequently suggested, to make it ‘the capital of unification’. In other words, it was recognised that as the new capital of the ‘Berlin Republic’ the city could restore its importance as a major playground of politics and regain its prestige as the country’s shop window on the world only by reconstructing and refurbishing its cultural assets, many of them damaged by war, division, and neglect. Even for a city whose halves had each become accustomed to living well beyond their own financial means, amalgamating and integrating their

representative cultural institutions imposed cultural policy obligations far exceeding the budget of a city-state. In addition, there were demands for new cultural institutions, especially museums and memorial sites, to give proper symbolic expression to the capital's political topography. The Federal authorities acknowledged that some cultural facilities in Berlin were charged with a national rather than merely regional mission, and in June 2001 concluded a treaty with the Land authorities, the *Hauptstadtkulturvertrag*, to support the cultural profile of the capital. The sum involved, in excess of €51 million, was earmarked to finance the Jewish Museum, the Berlin Festival, the House of the Cultures of the World, the Martin Gropius Exhibition Centre, and a part of the estates of the Prussian Cultural Trust. Subsequently an ever greater proportion of Berlin's cultural budget was shouldered by the Federal fiscus rather than the Land government, a show of largesse that did not meet with universal acclaim. As Nida-Rümelin (2001: 72) remarked in 2001, his predecessor as Federal Commissioner for Culture was frequently and at times savagely attacked by the culture ministers of the *Länder* for focusing his cultural policy too firmly on Berlin and thereby testing the limits of cultural federalism.

Since the early 1990s, another challenge to the 'cultural sovereignty' of the *Länder* has been posed by increasing harmonisation within the European Union. When announcing the programme of his new government on 10 November 1998, Chancellor Schröder declared that the newly created Commissioner for Culture would primarily 'understand his role as being to represent the interests of German culture on the international stage but above all at the European level' (quoted in Gau and Weber 2001: 271). Essentially this was Schröder's response to the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the founding document of the EU, which significantly now made explicit reference to the cultural dimension of united Europe's agenda with its proclamation that the community would 'contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States'. In the five paragraphs that constituted Article 128 of the treaty – subsequently to be taken over as Article 151 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) – the attempt was made to put some flesh on the bones of this nebulous aspiration, but in such a way as to reassure those who feared that it presaged the formulation of a common European cultural policy. Thus the first paragraph stated that the community would pursue its goal of developing the cultures of its member states 'while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore'. The so-called 'cultural compatibility clause' (*Kulturverträglichkeitsklausel* – §4) committed the EU to take cultural aspects into account in all of its other policy areas, thus relativising the primacy of economics in its decision-making processes. As the ultimate reassurance, the final paragraph spelled out what – to German ears, at any rate – sounded like the 'cultural sovereignty' of the member states: forms of intervention in cultural affairs, which in any case are restricted to measures promoting culture, must take account of the EU's hallowed subsidiarity principle. Resolutions by the EU's ministers of culture can only be passed unanimously and have the status of recommendations, which means that they are not binding on member states. Notwithstanding all these various limitations and qualifications, however, the *Länder* have remained wary of any efforts at harmonisation in the cultural sphere, which they see as just one of the many threats to their cherished 'cultural sovereignty' and the German model of federalism. At the same time, it is that model which, under the terms of the German constitution, is to be promoted as the basis for supporting the development of the European Union.<sup>13</sup>

It is clear from the argument so far that Germany understands itself as a nation of culture, but, crucially, one predicated on the recognition that culture differs from region to region and must not be centrally steered. Despite some coordination between them, Germany therefore has 16 cultural policies, as many as there are Federal states. The subsequent analysis can concentrate only on selected regions, which have been chosen for the following reasons: Berlin is both



the capital and one of Germany's three city-states (the others being Hamburg and Bremen); North Rhine-Westphalia, representing the large territorial states (*Flächenstaaten*) of the old Federal Republic, is the most populous and subregionally divided Land; and Saxony, while representative of the five new Länder, has a constitutionally distinct cultural policy.

### Metropolitan cultural policy: Berlin

Germany's self-understanding as a *Kulturstaat* finds its legal reflection in the constitutions of the various German states, including Berlin. Article 20, §2 of its constitution affirms: 'Das Land schützt und fördert das kulturelle Leben'. In the official English translation this becomes a general promise or even an exhortation: 'The *Land* shall protect and promote cultural life'. In the foreword to the 'Report on the Promotion of Culture' of 2011, the serving mayor and his secretary for cultural affairs assert that 'culture moves Berlin' and that the city's 'Senate understands itself as an enabler and promoter of culture' ('Kultur bewegt Berlin [. . .]. Der Senat sieht sich in der Rolle des Ermöglicbers und Förderers der Kultur'. Bürgermeister von Berlin 2011: 3). Berlin is without doubt a large and internationally important playground for culture, despite its relatively small size in comparison with some other capital cities. Culture in a very broad sense is accorded a place of honour in the decision-making discourse. The scope of action is defined as encompassing the material support of art and artists, the architectural heritage, cultural participation, education, and diversity; it also includes the 'cultural and creative economy', plus tourism (Bürgermeister von Berlin 2011: 5). The administrators and politicians involved might be described as custodians of cultural capital<sup>14</sup> in that they help preserve the accumulated cultural wealth and adjudicate on the criteria and financial means to augment it. The creative imaginary of the artists whose work the senate is minded to facilitate thus becomes an object of promotion, if not subsidy. Applications for projects or stipends can be made in eight subcategories of funding, from the pictorial arts and sculpture to literature, theatre, and music. Decisions are made by juries chosen from specialists in the field. Some €20 million have been available for disbursement each year since 2010. The senate's total budget for culture is given as €845 million in 2011. It is clear that Berlin is working hard at achieving a new identity that, without denying the Nazi past or its political division under the 'two Germanies' of 1949–90, is substantially predicated on the freedom and creativity of various arts, both traditional and popular, and on cutting-edge research and technology.

The city's international orientation and multi-ethnic population are stressed as signs of cultural richness. The *World Cities Culture Report*, published in 2012 on the initiative of the Mayor of London, acknowledges that 'the reunited Berlin is emerging as one of the creative hubs of Europe. Its "poor but sexy" image has helped attract a vibrant youth culture and a growing high-tech business sector' (BOP Consulting 2012). There is every chance that it will keep its sexiness, but it has to survive on straitened finances and to cope with pressing social problems such as the replacement in several districts of old rented accommodation by modernised owner-occupied apartment houses. The radical scale of this development is new for Berlin, where well into the 1990s socially mixed quarters predominated as a result of controlled rents. Growing feelings of alienation through physical deprivation, social segregation, ethnic discrimination, and also increased stress due to late-modern working conditions are recurring themes in Berlin, where the threat of poverty is 5 per cent higher than the German mean.<sup>15</sup> However, the Berlin administration does not miss a trick when it comes to projecting the city's significance as a fulcrum of international tolerance and multicultural variety. The authorities and the population alike are yearning for global recognition of Berlin's status as a *Weltstadt*. Against oft-repeated talk of its being just a patchwork of parallel communities with little



intercultural exchange, Berlin seeks to show the world how cultural diversity can bring about a new creative complexity by synthesising groups in common activities and by proactive public and private events management. Cultural diversity, celebrated most jubilantly at the annual Carnival of Cultures in May, is seen as a positive enrichment for the city. Like the rest of Germany, Berlin is engaged in a long learning process that may yet disprove prominent voices that have declared multiculturalism dead (Horst Seehofer) or failed (Angela Merkel, Thilo Sarrazin, and others).<sup>16</sup>

Since his reorganisation of the state government in 2006, Klaus Wowereit has chosen to absorb the role of senator for culture into his mayoral office. This gives him opportunities to be seen on red-carpet occasions with both representatives of international politics and show-business celebrities. The magnification of the ‘creative industries’, a mix of IT-based ventures and cultural initiatives, is a central concern in his advocacy of Berlin as a metropolis. In setting out his governmental programme on 12 January 2012, he spoke of Berlin as a ‘metropolis open to the world’. His address included statements that do not merely express intent but reflect already ongoing developments:

Berlin is regarded worldwide as a creative metropolis and a centre of contemporary art. The senate will ensure that the framework is in place for further good work by our operas, theatres, museums and cultural institutions. In collaboration with the Federal government we shall develop the Humboldt Forum as a site of cultural encounters with the non-European cultures of the world. The realisation of the Humboldt Forum will close a large gap in the historical centre of Berlin.

(Berlin gilt weltweit als Kreativmetropole und als Zentrum zeitgenössischer Kunst. Der Senat wird die Rahmenbedingungen für eine weiterhin gute Arbeit unserer Opern, Theater, Museen und Kultureinrichtungen sichern. Gemeinsam mit dem Bund werden wir das Humboldtforum zu einem Ort der kulturellen Begegnung mit den außer-europäischen Kulturen der Welt entwickeln. Die Verwirklichung des Humboldt-Forums schließt eine große Lücke im historischen Kern Berlins.)

(Wowereit 2012)

The tone is one of great confidence, factually supported by the high turnover of the creative industries in Berlin, which matches the city’s entire budget (€22.276 billion in 2012 and €22.493 billion in 2013). High-tech clusters plus the networks of art and culture account for a sixth of Berlin’s GDP. The international film festival, one of the largest in the world measured by the number of films shown and tickets sold, is part of this impressive staging of creativity. This means that in financial terms the extent of cultural activities cannot be measured solely by the figures in the senate’s budget for the cultural affairs section in the mayor’s office (€845 million in 2011). This official budget allocation, even when expanded by other budget lines related to culture, like research and development, schools and education, the Olympia Park, town planning, environment and tourism, and social integration, is easily outstripped by the total spend on culture and creative networks in Berlin. Such networks have their own department in the city administration, while the range and status of the cultural institutions that are part-financed by the senate is illustrated by the number of supervisory boards chaired or attended by the secretary for cultural affairs (André Schmitz), which include the board of the celebrated Berlin Philharmonic under Simon Rattle. Mixed-finance structures are the norm for these prestigious institutions. The three opera houses (including the Staatsoper under its director Daniel Barenboim), the Berlin ballet, the Berliner Ensemble, the Deutsches Theater, and the

Friedrichstadt-Palast, with its vast stage for spectacular musicals and shows on ice, are all run as limited companies with their own income streams, topped up by subsidies from the public purse.

The governing authorities are keen to find new sources of revenue, particularly because – according to the annual accounts comparing the finances of the Länder – the city is broke.<sup>17</sup> Under Germany's fiscal transfer mechanisms, which channel resources from the relatively richer regions to those that are deemed 'poorer', Berlin currently receives €3 billion. It is not simply for reasons of prestige that the city looks to culture in all its manifestations as a field that promises to maximise its economic wellbeing: the weight of the cultural industries, which can be defined broadly to encompass anything from the development of high and popular culture to that of innovative software, games, fashion, and advertising, is considered crucial. Two extensive studies on *Kulturwirtschaft in Berlin: Entwicklung und Potentiale* (Cultural Industries in Berlin: Development and Potential) were published in 2005 and 2009 respectively. They are flanked by further studies, expertise and advice offered by the Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Berlin is neither Germany's financial centre (which is Frankfurt am Main) nor the seat of its highest courts (which is Karlsruhe); culture and the creative industries are therefore major compensatory factors to improve its standing. Strategically, the chosen route to achieve expansion is the composition and promotion of clusters, particularly in the high-tech sector, bringing together individuals with projects, public institutions, and private firms. Innovation in science and technology and innovation in culture are seen as belonging together and are brought under the common heading of *Kreativwirtschaft* (creative industries). This suits city policymakers because, in order to enhance Berlin's status as a place offering critical mass, every effort is being made to attract still more scientific, cultural, and entrepreneurial talent – hence the stress on the already high level of education, the density of research, and the lively intellectual environment in the city.

A cluster strategy is in operation in many fields, not only in Berlin but throughout Germany. The Federal Ministry of Education and Research has subdivided the whole of Germany into metropolitan regions in order to finance and achieve internationally leading high-tech clusters. In Berlin, *Kreativwirtschaft* is itself defined as a cluster and described with the same permanently upbeat optimism typical of cultural policy more generally:

This cluster represents above average rates of growth. Circa 29,000 mainly small and medium-sized enterprises achieve an annual turnover of €22 billion. This means that the cluster contributes a sixth of the total GDP of Berlin. With over 220,000 employees, it constitutes an important element in the Berlin labour market.

(Das Cluster steht für überdurchschnittlich hohe Wachstumsraten. Rund 29.000 zumeist kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen erwirtschaften jährlich einen Umsatz von über 22 Mrd. €. Damit trägt das Cluster zu einem Sechstel zum Gesamtbruttosozialprodukt der Berliner Wirtschaft bei. Mit über 220.000 Beschäftigten stellt es einen wichtigen Beschäftigungsfaktor für den Berliner Arbeitsmarkt dar.)<sup>18</sup>

Significantly divorced from the more refined, exuberant, or ironical diction of the actual authors of creativity, the presentation of clusters is framed in the language of 'organisation man' (Whyte 1956), drawing uninhibitedly on Anglo-Americanisms and purpose-built verbal compounds. It is clear that the cultural policy of Berlin is designed to foreground its new identity. The mayor and his secretary of state see culture as having this vital purpose: 'In a metropolis that is marked by its diversity, culture provides both identity and social cohesion' ('Zugleich stiftet die Kultur Identität und Zusammenhalt in einer von Vielfalt geprägten Metropole') (Bürgermeister von Berlin/Senatskanzlei kulturelle Angelegenheiten 2011: 5). Pragmatically,

this functionalised concept of culture can be seen as a response to the de facto situation in a city whose inhabitants (like those of some other European and American cities) come from every part of the globe. It is, however, also a positive response to a negative past, from which it marks a determined departure. The memory of intolerance when variety, be it racial, religious, or ideological, was systematically destroyed by different forms of totalitarian regime is used as an implicit exhortation to prevent any kind of repetition of this history. Such memory finds its material expression in an ever growing number of memorial sites selectively inscribing the cityscape with monuments bearing witness to an otherwise unmasterable past. By this remembrance of the past, which has become part of cultural policy, the present authorities, usually in collaboration with private citizens and groups advancing particular commemorative initiatives, hope to strengthen further the commitment to tolerance and democracy in present-day society.

Cultural policy in Berlin is informed by a range of stimuli that by no means conform to a single ideological pattern. Unlike the images of Berlin presented in the contemporary novel or in film, which are based on fictional or documentary depictions of individual experience, the portrait sketched out here critically indicates the designs and intentions for this capital city on the part of its politicians, administrators, and corporate citizens. It is primarily their imagination and their interpretation of various public interests, as well as their need to legitimate their policy procedures and decisions in professional and political discourse, that determines much of the development that is taking place. Such rule by democratic and administrative action is neither beholden strictly to the utility demands of the market nor free of confusion and obfuscation, as is glaringly obvious from the repeated failure to keep to targets and deadlines. The new airport at Schönefeld, the reconstruction of the Berlin state opera house and of the most prestigious cinema (Zoo-Palast), and the new building of the Federal intelligence service are some of the notorious examples cited by critics. Seemingly endemic hitches, which some Germans fear damage their nation's reputation for efficiency (and which were cited by Mayor Klaus Wowereit in his resignation speech of 25 August 2014 as a major factor in his decision to step down the following December) do not contribute to the positive image of a city that prides itself above all on its cultural radiance, a point that Wowereit never ceased to stress during his period of office (2001–14).

### **The challenge of the metropolitan regions: North Rhine-Westphalia**

Unlike Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia covers a relatively large geographical area, and it has by far the most inhabitants of the Federal Länder. While its population density is lower than that of the German city-states, it is higher (523 inhabitants per square kilometre in 2011) than that of the neighbouring Netherlands (402 inhabitants per square kilometre). North Rhine-Westphalia is divided into 10 subregions that are encouraged to preserve and develop their own cultural distinctiveness, at times challenging Berlin's status as an unquestioned metropolis. Federalism acts as a safeguard against a disproportionate amount of material and cultural wealth being concentrated in the capital city. Outside the capital, certain regions are also able to think of themselves as metropolitan. Within the EU, the label 'metropolitan region' is now applied with somewhat inflationary frequency, but in Germany the sophisticated infrastructure of these regions – sociologically, culturally, or in terms of transport facilities – makes such labelling plausible. It is officially supported by the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning, which has subdivided Germany into 11 metropolitan regions, of which Rhine-Ruhr is by far the largest and, with its 11.69 million inhabitants, the only one to approach the size of greater London or Paris. 'Metropole Ruhr' has its own website and, as Essen-Ruhrgebiet, was awarded the title European Capital of Culture 2010. Despite the hopes of local intellectuals that its 53 towns would be politically agglomerated into a single *Ruhrstadt*,<sup>19</sup> the region remains an

administrative mélange of town councils and locally organised industrial associations parochially holding on to their separateness and their considerable budgetary debts. It is remarkable that the conception of an extensive cultural programme by public and private institutions and individuals was able to weld the region together, at least for the duration of 12 months, to play out the dream of a coordinated metropolis.

Despite its common cultural identity, which is supported by a dense infrastructure of roads, motorways, trams, trains, underground systems, waterways, joint efforts to improve the environment (*Emscherogenossenschaft*, *Lippegenossenschaft*, *Ruhrverband*), over 100 theatres, a dozen musical stages, three opera houses, and prominent rock and popular music venues, the jealously defended municipal demarcations persist. Although the North Rhine-Westphalian government is committed to encouraging the transformation of the area by increasing its leisure, cultural, educational, and research attractions, it is doubtful whether it can force these municipalities into an administratively synchronised metropolitan unit. However, at least in the field of cultural policy, there remains a determination on the part of organisational and marketing institutions such as *Kultur Ruhr* and public or private trusts to preserve the impetus of *Kulturhauptstadt Ruhr 2010*. This subregion's corporate identity as an area that has enriched the cultural landscapes of Europe and its use of culture as a lever for both creative thinking and material innovation are to be further developed to facilitate the massive restructuring of the economy from heavy to lighter industries. Culture is the stimulant for new thought, new social interconnection, and the transformation and re-use of old industrial structures. This is signally done in the long international festival season entitled *Ruhrtriennale*. Politicians like to stress that culture is no luxury, that it should be accessible to all types of public, and that it must be regarded as 'yeast in the dough', energising the whole of society. At the same time, they have announced cuts in the arts budget for North Rhine-Westphalia, from €198 million to €182.5 million in 2013 – although in the context of the creative industries these figures must be seen as seedcorn money generating its own multipliers by flanking privately financed ventures and public-private foundations that contribute their own funds. Public lotteries also provide support for the arts, which can be funded more easily if networks and clusters of excellence in and between different cultural subregions are established.

The ministry responsible for cultural matters is called the Ministry for the Family, Children, Youth, Culture and Sport, which sometimes works together with the Ministry for Innovation, Science and Research. Although culture appears here as just one area amongst others, it is clear from the actual use of culture as an operative concept guiding governance that it is considered vital as a transforming incentive in all aspects of life. The motto is 'Change through culture and culture through change' (Staatskanzlei des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 2009: 7). Since the beginning of the new millennium, the state has been divided into 10 distinct, though not hermetically sealed, cultural landscapes. Apart from representing different types of terrain, both physically and historically, they pursue differently accentuated projects in collaboration with a multiplicity of initiatives designed to meet individuals' demands and improve their quality of life. A special report issued by the ministry in 2011 provided an impressive survey of the state's support for culture, complete with detailed figures (Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 2011). In this report, quite remarkably, the word culture is used to describe the capacity of creative activities to interconnect with all others, and to project the human being as at once a value for enterprise and an enterprising being. Economic and cultural life and the public and private spheres are to be brought into productive communication. Within creative establishments, the same criteria that determine the organisation of labour in industry are to be applied, including the flexibilisation of work times, skills, and tasks. This is illustrated by the way in which government administrators define their role as being to give advice and financial support to cultural institutions like theatres

and museums on issues relating to the organisation of work, the management of knowledge, the improvement of health, the coordination of family and professional duties, and the attainment of further qualifications.<sup>20</sup>

In North Rhine-Westphalia there are a number of major cities with claims to metropolitan status, foremost amongst them Cologne, which calls itself the *Kulturmetropole am Rhein*. Its city council approved a detailed cultural development plan in 2009 (Stadt Köln 2009). Despite incessant wrangles between political parties and individuals, largely over public debt, the council is clearly determined to preserve and enhance the cultural attractions of this ancient city. Like Berlin, it tries to combine native traditions with the integration of European and global cultures, while preserving its many historical monuments such as its famous cathedral, its Roman remains, its international museums, and its large arenas and exhibition and media centres. Its many carnival societies, with their rich costumes or countercultural attire, sustain a long season of good-humoured merrymaking, culminating in a huge procession of fools and floats. The history of the carnival provides an example of how a lived culture both complies with and censors the present, an observation that could also be applied to the unique international literary festival (*Literaturfest*) that has taken root in Cologne. Cultural policy here is situated at the interface between administrative institutions and initiatives arising from civic society. This is also true of another metropolis, Düsseldorf. With its Deutsche Oper am Rhein and its ballet, museums, attractions for freelance artists, and extraordinarily active trade fairs, as well as its own carnival season, it, too, has achieved an international presence that is felt well beyond its regional anchorage, and as far away as Moscow and Shanghai (Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf 2010: 7, 14).

### Cultural policy in the new Länder

Unlike in the Federal Republic, cultural policy in the German Democratic Republic was not the prerogative of regional states, which were dissolved in 1952. All policy was determined centrally by the ruling party (SED – Socialist Unity Party of Germany) and implemented at the various levels of the state hierarchy – organised in descending order into *Bezirke* (administrative areas), *Kreise* (districts), and *Kommunen* (municipalities). Supplementing the activities of the state administration, but equally subject to overt control by a centrally directed ideology, were a wealth of cultural facilities affiliated to industrial concerns, agricultural production cooperatives (LPGs), and other, quasi-party organisations such as the Kulturbund der DDR (Cultural Alliance of the GDR)<sup>21</sup>, the Demokratische Frauenbund Deutschlands (Democratic Women’s Association of Germany), and the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (Union of Free German Trade Unions – with around 250,000 officials involved in organising cultural activities at local level). For all that culture was manifestly conceived of as an instrument of ideological dissemination, the massive state investment in local and regional amenities throughout the 40-year history of the GDR yielded a cultural landscape that, even by West German standards, was both impressive and extensive. To allay fears that this rich cultural infrastructure would simply be swept away by the tide of restructuring attendant on German unification, the Federal government made available substantial funds with which, for a three-year period, culture was to be subsidised in the new Länder. As defined by the German Unification Treaty (Article 35, §2), the purpose of this transitional funding was to ensure that ‘no harm should befall the cultural assets [of the new Länder]’. Nevertheless, the process of bringing the cultural sphere in the new Länder into line with the model prevailing in the rest of the Federal Republic – a restructuring that was not concluded until the end of the 1990s – was marked by a number of changes (Strittmatter 2010: 74): concentration (such as the merger of orchestras or the amalgamation of library holdings); administrative relocation (of amenities such as youth centres, which became

the responsibility of the local Ministry for Women and Youth, or cinemas, which were now classified as commercial enterprises); closure (above all of the cultural facilities affiliated to factories and trade unions); and expansion (through the founding of new amenities, particularly in the museum sector, and the development of an autonomous cultural scene, the like of which was not allowed to exist in the GDR).

The emphasis given in the Unification Treaty to preserving cultural assets implied a somewhat narrow perspective and created the impression of an exclusive preoccupation with the so-called ‘beacons’ of culture (*Leuchttürme*), namely those institutions, facilities, and artefacts deemed to be of national and not merely regional or local significance. However, the thinking informing the initiatives taken in some of the new Länder evidenced a more expansive and creative approach to cultural policy. Thus in its lengthy document on *Landeskulturkonzept* (concept of culture for the state), presented to the regional parliament in November 2004, the government of Saxony-Anhalt stressed that its task was not to ‘devise conceptually’ the cultural development of the Land but rather to ‘maintain the preconditions for a varied cultural life’:

For this to happen, it is not enough just to provide funding; it also requires, amongst other things, support for networks, media, and public information work, communication platforms, state-wide initiatives, and targeted support for prioritised, profile-building cultural projects. [. . .] When priorities are set, particular importance attaches to certain kinds of things, especially cultural tourism, cultural values that might help improve the image of the *Land*, and the kinds of facilities that enhance cultural identity.

(Dies kann keineswegs nur durch die Bereitstellung finanzieller Mittel geschehen, sondern u.a. durch die Unterstützung von Netzwerken, durch Medien- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, durch die Errichtung von Kommunikationsplattformen, durch landesweite Initiativen und durch gezielte Förderung von profilbestimmenden Schwerpunkten der Kulturarbeit [. . .] Bei den kulturpolitischen Schwerpunktsetzungen gewinnen allerdings bestimmte Aspekte eine herausgehobene Bedeutung. Das betrifft insbesondere: kulturtouristische Effekte, kulturelle Inhalte, die in der Außenwirkung das Ansehen des Landes verbessern können, Angebote, die besonders geeignet sind, kulturelle Identität zu stiften.)

(Landesregierung von Sachsen-Anhalt 2004: 2–3)

The emphasis here on forging a regional identity is perhaps understandable, for as a relatively recent creation – dating back to 1945, when the Soviet military administration simply bolted on the Prussian parts of Saxony to the state of Anhalt – Saxony-Anhalt lacked the historical roots underpinning other ‘new’ Länder such as Brandenburg or Saxony. Nevertheless, as their respective cultural policies demonstrated, these states were likewise not content to restrict their agenda to merely preserving their cultural assets. In accordance with Article 34 of its constitution, in which is inscribed the obligation to preserve and promote culture, the state of Brandenburg has gradually evolved a model of cooperative cultural development, which, in different forms, also applies in other Federal states. Like those states, Brandenburg wished to define the collaboration between the Land and municipal cultural authorities. In 2012 the Brandenburg parliament endorsed a prospectus dealing with cultural strategy in which this collaboration is described afresh:

The state will work in partnership with the municipalities – which also have a constitutional responsibility for cultural affairs – to maintain the region’s cultural infrastructure. The aim of the state is to support the municipalities in creating the necessary framework for

universal participation in culture, which the state can shore up additionally on a project-by-project basis.

(Das Land wird die kulturelle Infrastruktur arbeitsteilig mit den Kommunen fördern, die ebenfalls eine verfassungsgemäße Verantwortung für kulturelle Angelegenheiten haben. Ziel des Landes ist es, die Kommunen darin zu unterstützen, die grundlegenden Voraussetzungen für die kulturelle Teilhabe aller bereitzuhalten, auf die die Landesförderung projektbezogen aufsetzen kann.)

(Land Brandenburg Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur 2012: 9)

In the aforementioned report ‘Culture in Germany’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2007) the Federal commission of inquiry on culture in Germany described Brandenburg’s cooperative approach to cultural policy as exemplary. Arguably, however, the most distinctive model is that operated by Saxony. In Article 1 of its constitution, the Free State of Saxony (Freistaat Sachsen) – the title under which the Land proudly announced its reclaimed sovereignty in 1990 – defines itself as ‘a democratic and social state founded in law and committed to the protection of the natural foundations of life and to culture’. This self-identification as a ‘culture state’ reflected not only Saxony’s tradition-laden history but also one aspect of its more recent past, for within its boundaries were located more than half of the cultural facilities that had been built up in the GDR (Knoblich 2010: 62). The legislation introduced in 1994, however, marked the clearest possible break with the centralising tendencies of the former socialist state. Moreover, the Culture Areas Law (Kulturraumgesetz) made Saxony unique amongst the Länder in imposing a legal obligation on municipalities to foster culture. This had long been a matter of some debate. The Federal report on culture, for instance, concluded that while a blanket obligation to provide ‘all forms of cultural work’ did not exist, the remit of the municipalities nevertheless included ‘the duty to oversee culture, which was to be discharged through their cultural policy’ as they saw fit (Deutscher Bundestag 2007: 90). Beyond its legal ramifications, the 1994 law also enacted crucial administrative and financial measures. Saxony was divided into five rural and three urban ‘culture areas’ (the latter co-extensive with the towns of Dresden, Chemnitz, and Leipzig).<sup>22</sup> In order that the financial burden of promoting culture should not fall disproportionately on a few municipalities, each rural area was to be party to the overall financial settlement (at a rate that, since 2011, has amounted on average to €8.70 per head of population), while the state government has supplemented the budget with an annual contribution of around €87 million.

For proponents of the Saxon model, its great merit is that it not only serves to strengthen regional identity but also fosters collaboration and solidarity, since the rural culture areas unite economically weaker communities with municipalities possessing greater financial muscle. This compares favourably with the excessively competitive mentality promoted by, for example, the Conurbation Law (Ballungsraumgesetz) enacted in Hesse in 2001, which effectively established the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region as the state’s global player and reduced other municipalities to second-class status.<sup>23</sup> By contrast, as its candidate in the 2010 competition for European Capital of Culture Saxony chose not the historic city of Dresden, or even Leipzig, but the town of Görlitz in the rural culture area of Upper Lusatia-Lower Silesia, whose impressive joint bid with the neighbouring Polish town of Zgorzelec lost out narrowly to Essen-Ruhr in the verdict of the EU jury. Faced with the criticism that the Kulturraumgesetz potentially contradicts the clause in the Basic Law guaranteeing the municipalities the right to administer their own affairs (Article 28, §2), advocates of the Saxon legislation point out that the governing body of each rural culture area is comprised of delegates from the relevant municipalities. Moreover, the



interests of the latter are also represented on Saxony's Kultursenat, an advisory committee that is completely independent of the Ministry for Science and Art and liaises between the state government, parliament, and the municipalities. Generally throughout Germany such powerful advisory committees exist at the Federal level (Deutscher Kulturrat), at the Land level (for example, in North Rhine-Westphalia or in Thuringia), and at the municipal level (for example, in Bochum, Cologne, Augsburg, Halberstadt etc.).

Perhaps the most telling indicator of the efficacy of Saxony's cultural policy, however, is a simple statistic: with the exception of the city-state of Berlin (and also that of Hamburg, albeit only by a tiny fraction), Saxony boasts the highest expenditure on culture per head of population in the Federal Republic (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2012: 34). Such lavish funding helps explain how it is able to sustain 14 subsidised public theatres, the same number as the substantially more populous and affluent state of Baden-Württemberg.<sup>24</sup> In the season of 2007–08, the year in which the Kulturraumgesetz was renewed, those theatres put on an astonishing 661 productions, a figure topped only by Germany's largest state, North Rhine-Westphalia (Knoblich 2010: 65). Another branch of culture that has flourished spectacularly – and this is true of the new Länder generally, not just Saxony – is the museum sector, which since unification has experienced a veritable boom in the number and variety of museums as well as in annual attendance figures.<sup>25</sup> As Tobias Knoblich (2010: 67–8) has observed, the remarkable growth in the number of institutions specialising in industry, agriculture, and technology is undoubtedly related to the general process of de-industrialisation that Saxony has undergone since 1990, while the increase in and popularity of *Heimat* museums reflect the renewed interest in local and regional identity that accompanied the municipalities regaining their autonomy. Although institutes devoted to the history of the GDR have predictably fared less well – the Panorama Museum in Bad Frankenhausen (in Thuringia) being a rare survivor<sup>26</sup> – one link with the past has been maintained. The East German regime had always shown great commitment to respecting the rights of the Sorbs, a Slavic minority group in the GDR. In 1999, in a notable example of cross-border collaboration, the states of Saxony and Brandenburg concluded a treaty establishing the Stiftung für das Sorbische Volk (Foundation for the Sorbian People), which was dedicated to the preservation of the language, customs, and traditions of the Sorbs, a goal similarly pursued by two theatres in Upper Lusatia–Lower Silesia, the Deutsch-Sorbische Volkstheater Bautzen and the Sorbische National-Ensemble Bautzen.

The expansion in the museum sector since unification was exceeded by only one other type of cultural activity in the new Länder, the development of socio-culture – for the simple reason that no such activity had existed in the GDR. This phenomenon was associated with the radical democratisation of culture that since the 1970s had been advocated by progressive West German cultural administrators like Hilmar Hoffmann and Hermann Glaser as the guiding principle of cultural policy, above all at the municipal level. In embracing this development, Saxony, like the other new Länder, was able to make use of the cultural clubhouses (*Kulturhäuser*) that had existed in many places in East Germany.<sup>27</sup>

## Culture and the quality of life

Glaser became a self-styled 'propagandist of the niche' (Glaser 1976: 189). The notion of socio-culture he advocated was more comprehensive than the narrower idea of high culture. For him it was necessary to acknowledge the way in which life is conducted and creatively developed in particular milieus, typically centred on locality, whether urban, suburban, or rural. Socio-culture was an attempt to provide 'an additional communicative level within pluralist society, which is dissected into diverse individual interests and conflicts and shot through with specific

barriers to understanding' (Glaser 1974: 49). Accordingly, culture, freed from its restrictive equation with the privileged sphere of artistic production and aesthetic appreciation, was to be aligned with broader practices in the media, social interaction, and cognitive behaviour. The goal of culture, understood now as a network of communicative practices, was to generate emancipated citizens empowered to think critically about themselves and their position in the contemporary world. A wave of socio-cultural activities that began in the Federal Republic in the 1970s eventually swept through the whole of Germany after unification. Its continuing growth is attested to by the myriad of socio-cultural organisations (currently 470) represented by the Bundesvereinigung Soziokultureller Zentren e.V. (Federal Association of Socio-Cultural Centres). It has its own periodical (*soziokultur*) and other occasional publications, all of them made available online.<sup>28</sup> The association's motto, 'Diversity. A matter of principle' (*Vielfalt. Aus Prinzip*), encapsulates both the immense range of social, cultural, educative, and artistic activities, and the remarkable interactive mix of professionals and laymen/women, officialdom and grassroots, public and private funding involved.

It is clear that, in the whole of contemporary Germany, quality of life is intended to be enhanced by an open-minded cultural policy that is bolstered by the development of cultural industries and socio-cultural initiatives. Municipal, regional, and Federal subsidies are designed to preserve and provide space for the lived identity in distinctiveness, difference, and togetherness, and for the creativity of society as a whole. But while official policy wishes to address cultural needs in every corner of the land, culture resists intrusive administration, for it encompasses creative responses to life and, to retain its vitality, feeds on fundamental spontaneity. Hence under democratic conditions it can neither be fitted neatly into a cultural policy framework, however specifically regional in conception, nor channelled in a single ideological direction.<sup>29</sup> As has been indicated in this chapter, the tensions and contradictions evident in contemporary German society will be expressed even in subsidised cultural practices, artefacts, texts, and events. Culture may be a universe of acquired meanings, articulated in particular patterns of behaviour and in the characteristic structuring of the material environment. But it is also dynamic, generating new ideas by individuals and groups that change tastes, lifestyles, built environments, and modes of interaction. Such change typically originates within urban environments, which, given the way in which funding is distributed under the Federal system, allows metropolitan cultural variety to thrive in many conurbations. To the extent that culture materially and cognitively embeds all aspects of human life, it is larger than any given political or legal structures. It is a primary element of all social constellations, but at the same it is rooted in civic society, which, without political and legal structures, is fatally exposed to disorder. Hence the preference for hybrid associational arrangements in the conduct of cultural life, where official agents of political authority combine with independent organisations of citizens.

The National Council for Culture (Deutscher Kulturrat), frequently consulted by government, reflects this hybridity in the make-up of its executive.<sup>30</sup> Its informative bi-monthly journal, *Politik und Kultur*, regularly publishes lists of cultural institutions in Germany that for one reason or another are threatened with closure. It criticises the loss of jobs in cultural policy administration, but it also makes helpful suggestions about how cultural diversity might be enhanced and legally guaranteed in Germany and Europe. In other words, it echoes the predominant tenor in a nation of culture minded above all to nurture creative impulses in the whole of society. The journal and the institution behind it are another illustration of the way that practices have evolved which both presuppose and engender vibrant participatory discourses resisting the twin threats of economic utilitarianism and ideological rigidity. The chief motivation governing all endeavours in this field is the ideal-type of a *Kulturation* that actively fosters culture as a non-coercive factor determining the quality of life.

## Notes

- 1 A notable exception is Klaus von Beyme (2012).
- 2 For a critical survey of cultural theories see Nünning and Nünning (2003) and Moebius and Quadflieg (2006).
- 3 The ‘grand coalition’ between CDU/CSU and SPD is committed in a major way to culture as a variety of practices and also intends to expand it as a subject of scholarly analysis; see Bundesregierung (2013).
- 4 See, for example, the comments of Hans Zehetmair (2001: 87), former Minister for Science, Research, and Art in Bavaria. For the same reason, Gau and Weber (2001: 269) prefer the term *Kulturauftrag der Länder*, as proposed by Geis (1992: 524).
- 5 In addition to the constitutions of Länder cited elsewhere in this chapter, see, for example, Article 40, §2 of the constitution of the Rhineland-Palatinate (1947): ‘Die Teilnahme an den Kulturgütern des Lebens ist dem gesamten Volke zu ermöglichen’ (‘It is the task of the state to facilitate the participation of the entire populace in life’s cultural wealth’).
- 6 The Federal Commissioner for Culture and the Media is something of a hybrid between a ministry and a government agency. Although based in Bonn, it is affiliated to the Federal Chancellery.
- 7 Quoted by Naumann (2001: 104). By ‘Wilhelminism’ Schirrmacher presumably meant a tendency to cloak the culture of the Federal Republic in the mantle of boastful pomposity and nationalistic pride, as had happened in the era before 1914.
- 8 Hesse coined the term in his essay ‘Der unitarische Bundesstaat’, which was first published in 1962 and is reproduced in Hesse (1982).
- 9 See Zehetmair’s unequivocal endorsement of both ‘cooperative federalism’ and the *Kulturstiftung der Länder* as a paradigmatic example of that principle in practice (Zehetmair 2001: 90).
- 10 The examples he cites of where such advisory competence is relevant include the tax system, copyright law, foundation law, and the fixed book price agreement.
- 11 An arrangement based on extra taxation in the whole of Germany, ensuring substantial financial transfers to the economically much weaker new Länder.
- 12 The citizens of Berlin voted by a slim majority in favour of the merger.
- 13 See Article 23, § 1 of the Grundgesetz.
- 14 Pierre Bourdieu (1983), in an article that first appeared in German translation, used this term to point to social inequalities created by individuals having uneven access to culture. By contrast, cultural administrators operate with a very broad, class-neutral definition of culture in an attempt to show that cultural capital can be accessed by all. Critical analysis is needed to establish the validity of such claims.
- 15 For the relevant statistics see ‘Armutsgefährdungsquoten im Bundesmaßstab’ (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2011: 24); for a critical description see Gröschner (2013).
- 16 For the judgements of Seehofer (Prime Minister of Bavaria) and Merkel (Federal Chancellor) see *Der Spiegel* (2010); see also Sarrazin (2010).
- 17 See Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2012) for the official statistics.
- 18 See [www.berlin.de/projektzukunft/kreativwirtschaft/clusterstrategien/](http://www.berlin.de/projektzukunft/kreativwirtschaft/clusterstrategien/) (accessed 14 March 2013).
- 19 See the large and richly illustrated volume *Ruhrstadt: Die andere Metropole*, edited for the Kommunalverband by Gerd Willamowski, Dieter Nellen, and Manfred Bourrée (2000).
- 20 See [www.ostwestfalen-lippe.de/Blogs/OWL-Kulturburo-Blog/unternehmensWert-Mensch-fur-Kreativunternehmen.html](http://www.ostwestfalen-lippe.de/Blogs/OWL-Kulturburo-Blog/unternehmensWert-Mensch-fur-Kreativunternehmen.html) (accessed 12 March 2013).
- 21 This was founded in 1945, renamed as such in 1974, and represented at all levels of government.
- 22 The rural culture areas are: Vogtland-Zwickau, Erzgebirge-Mittelsachsen, Leipziger Raum, Elbtal-Sächsische Schweiz-Ostergebirge, and Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien.
- 23 For a comparison of the two laws and their consequences for cultural policy see Kramer (2010: 260–1).
- 24 Only Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, both of which are considerably larger than Saxony, boast more, with 20 and 26 respectively (Deutscher Bühnenverein 2012: 257).
- 25 For example, in 1991 Saxony had a total of 265 museums; 20 years later the number had risen to 388 (Staatliche Museen zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz 2012: 28).
- 26 Built on the site of the last battle of the Peasants War of 1525, the museum’s prime exhibit is an enormous historical panorama painting by the Leipzig artist Werner Tübke. The museum took 20 years to complete and, ironically, opened barely a month before the fall of the Berlin Wall signalled the end of the socialist state it was designed to celebrate.

- 27 'Das Konzept Soziokultur resultiert aus den Entwicklungen einer neuen Kulturpolitik der 70er Jahre in den alten Bundesländern und fand in Sachsen eine Erweiterung um Traditionen aus der Klub- und Kulturhausarbeit der ehemaligen DDR. Beiden Entwicklungen ist ein weiter Kulturbegriff gemein.' [The concept of socio-culture was the product of a new approach to culture in the old Federal states during the 1970s, which in Saxony was extended by the culture-club work in the former GDR. Common to both developments is a broad conception of culture] (Landesverband Soziokultur Sachsen e.V. 2013: 32).
- 28 See [www.soziokultur.de/bsz/node/10](http://www.soziokultur.de/bsz/node/10) (accessed 10 July 2013).
- 29 The allusion here is to Herbert Marcuse's acerbic analysis (1964). We do not accept his argument but read it as warning of an inherent danger in present-day society. He held that the democratic discourse has in fact been destroyed by technological rationality undermining it.
- 30 For the composition and the tasks of this organisation see [www.kulturrat.de/detail.php?detail=170&rubrik=1](http://www.kulturrat.de/detail.php?detail=170&rubrik=1) (accessed 24 September 2013).

## Bibliography

- Adorno, T.W. and Horkheimer, M. (1979) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cumming, London: Verso.
- Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg (ed.) (2011) *Regionaler Sozialbericht Berlin und Brandenburg 2011*, Berlin: Kulturbuch Verlag.
- Bachmann-Medick, D. (2010) *Cultural Turns. Neuorientierungen in den Kulturwissenschaften*, rowohlt's enzyklopädie, 4th edn, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- BOP Consulting (2012) *World Cities Culture Report 2012*, on behalf of the Mayor of London. Online. Available at <http://worldcitiesculturereport.com/cities/Berlin> (accessed 15 March 2013).
- Bourdieu, P. (1983) 'Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital', in R. Kreckel (ed.) *Soziale Ungleichheiten*, Soziale Welt Sonderband 2, Göttingen: Otto Schwartz Verlag, 183–98.
- Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2012) 'Die Ausgaben und Einnahmen der Länder für das Haushaltsjahr 2012, 1–4. Quartal'. Online. Available at [www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche\\_Finzen/Foederale\\_Finanzbeziehungen/Laenderhaushalte/2012/Einnahmen-Ausgaben-der-Laender-Jahr-2012-endg.Erg.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=1](http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finzen/Foederale_Finanzbeziehungen/Laenderhaushalte/2012/Einnahmen-Ausgaben-der-Laender-Jahr-2012-endg.Erg.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1) (accessed 8 June 2013).
- Bundesregierung (2013) *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 18. Legislaturperiode*. Online. Available at [www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/\\_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-koalitionsvertrag.pdf;jsessionid=717F1CCF800237B9E4A9E9358FC9065F.s1t2?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=2](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2013/2013-12-17-koalitionsvertrag.pdf;jsessionid=717F1CCF800237B9E4A9E9358FC9065F.s1t2?__blob=publicationFile&v=2) (accessed 15 December 2013).
- Bundesvereinigung Soziokultureller Zentren e.V. (2013) Online. Available at [www.soziokultur.de/bsz/node/10](http://www.soziokultur.de/bsz/node/10) (accessed 8 June 2013).
- Bürgermeister von Berlin (ed.) (2011) *Kulturförderbericht 2011 des Landes Berlin*, Berlin: Senatskanzlei-Kulturelle Angelegenheiten. Online. Available at [www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/sen-kultur/kulturfoerderbericht\\_2011.pdf](http://www.berlin.de/imperia/md/content/sen-kultur/kulturfoerderbericht_2011.pdf) (accessed 8 October 2014).
- Der Spiegel* (2010) 'Integration: Merkel erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert'. Online. Available at [www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html](http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html) (accessed 8 June 2013).
- Deutscher Bühnenverein (2012) *Theaterstatistik 2010/2011*, Cologne: Deutscher Bühnenverein, Bundesverband deutscher Theater.
- Deutscher Bundestag (2007) *Schlußbericht der Enquete-Kommission 'Kultur in Deutschland'*, Cologne: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Deutscher Kulturrat (2013) 'Was ist der Deutsche Kulturrat e.V.?' Online. Available at [www.kulturrat.de/detail.php?detail=170&rubrik=1](http://www.kulturrat.de/detail.php?detail=170&rubrik=1) (accessed 10 September 2013).
- Forschungsgruppe Weltanschauungen in Deutschland (2011) 'Religionszugehörigkeit, Deutschland'. Online. Available at [http://fowid.de/fileadmin/datenarchiv/Religionszugehoerigkeit/Religionszugehoerigkeit\\_Bevoelkerung\\_1970\\_2011.pdf](http://fowid.de/fileadmin/datenarchiv/Religionszugehoerigkeit/Religionszugehoerigkeit_Bevoelkerung_1970_2011.pdf) (accessed 13 July 2013).
- Gau, D. and Weber, J.-I. (2001) 'Die Kulturpolitik der Länder im Spannungsfeld zwischen Bundesebene und Europäischer Gemeinschaft', *Jahrbuch für Kulturpolitik 2001*, 2: 269–77.
- Geis, M.-E. (1992) 'Die "Kulturhoheit der Länder". Historische und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte des Kulturföderalismus am Beispiel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Die öffentliche Verwaltung*, 12: 522–9.
- Geis, M.-E. (2001) 'Kulturföderalismus und kulturelle Eigengesetzlichkeit: eine juristische Symbiose', *Jahrbuch der Kulturpolitik 2001*, 2: 139–52.

- Glaser, H. (1974) 'Das Unbehagen an der Kulturpolitik', in O. Schwencke, K.H. Revemann, and H. Spielhoff (eds) *Plädoyers für eine neue Kulturpolitik*, Munich: Hanser.
- Glaser, H. (1976) 'Document: Joys and Sorrows of a Utopian Cultural Administrator (Copeland Lecture at Amherst College, April 1976)', *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 9(2): 185–94.
- Gröschner, A. (2013) 'Berlin – Die entfremdete Stadt', 14 November, Heinrich Böll Stiftung. Online. Available at [www.boell.de/de/2013/11/14/berlin-die-entfremdete-stadt](http://www.boell.de/de/2013/11/14/berlin-die-entfremdete-stadt) (accessed 13 June 2013).
- Häberle, P. (2001) 'Kulturhoheit im Bundesstaat – Entwicklungen und Perspektiven', *Jahrbuch der Kulturpolitik* 2001, 2: 115–37.
- Hesse, K. (1982) *Konrad Hesse: Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. P. Häberle and A. Hollerbach, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller.
- Knoblich, T.J. (2010) 'Kulturelle Infrastruktur in Sachsen und ihre Entwicklung seit 1990', *Jahrbuch der Kulturpolitik* 2010, 10: 61–72.
- Kramer, D. (2010) 'Metropolen und Umland: Kulturanalyse und Kulturpolitik', *Jahrbuch der Kulturpolitik* 2006, 6: 255–64.
- Land Brandenburg Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (2012) *Kulturpolitische Strategie 2012*, Potsdam: Brandenburgische Universitätsdruckerei und Verlagsgesellschaft.
- Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (2011) *Kulturbericht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Kulturförderung 2011*, Ministerium für Familie, Kinder, Jugend, Kultur und Sport. Online. Available at [www.miz.org/artikel/2013\\_Kulturbericht\\_NRW\\_2011.pdf](http://www.miz.org/artikel/2013_Kulturbericht_NRW_2011.pdf) (accessed 13 June 2013).
- Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf (2010) *Kulturreport 2009/2010. Geschäftsbericht des Kulturdezernates der Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf*, Düsseldorf: Stadtbetrieb Zentrale Dienste.
- Landesregierung von Sachsen-Anhalt (2004) *Leitlinien zur Kulturpolitik des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt (Landeskulturbegriff)*. Online. Available at [https://www.sachsen-anhalt.de/fileadmin/Files/Landeskultur\\_konzept\\_Sachsen-Anhalt.pdf](https://www.sachsen-anhalt.de/fileadmin/Files/Landeskultur_konzept_Sachsen-Anhalt.pdf) (accessed 27 April 2013).
- Landesverband Soziokultur Sachsen e.V. (2013) *Soziokultur in Sachsen 2013*. Online. Available at <http://soziokultur-sachsen.de/verband/78-news/news/271-soziokultur-in-sachsen-2013> (accessed 15 November 2013)
- Marcuse, H. (1964) *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, Boston: Beacon Press.
- Moebius, M. and Quadflieg, D. (eds) (2006) *Kultur: Theorien der Gegenwart*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Mohrshäuser, B. (1998) *Liebeserklärung an eine häßliche Stadt: Berliner Gefühle*, Frankfurt a.m.: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch.
- Naumann, M. (2000) 'Zentralismus schadet nicht', *Die Zeit*, 45, 2 November.
- Naumann, M. (2001) *Die schönste Form der Freiheit*, Berlin: Siedler.
- Nida-Rümelin, J. (2001) 'Perspektiven des Kulturföderalismus in Deutschland', *Jahrbuch der Kulturpolitik* 2001, 2: 63–74.
- Nünning, A. and Nünning, V. (eds) (2003) *Konzepte der Kulturwissenschaften: Theoretische Grundlagen – Ansätze – Perspektiven*, Stuttgart and Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzler.
- Sarrazin, T. (2010) *Deutschland schafft sich ab*, Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt.
- Staatliche Museen zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz. Institut für Museumsforschung (2012) *Statistische Gesamterhebung an den Museen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für das Jahr 2011*, Berlin: Institut für Museumsforschung.
- Staatskanzlei des Landes Nordrhein Westfalen (2009) *Strukturwandel durch Kultur. Städte und Regionen im postindustriellen Wandel*, Düsseldorf.
- Stadt Köln (2009) *Kulturmetropole am Rhein. Teil 1: Charta*. Online. Available at [www.stadt-koeln.de/media/asset/content/pdf41/kulturentwicklungsplan\\_-\\_teil\\_1\\_-\\_charta.pdf](http://www.stadt-koeln.de/media/asset/content/pdf41/kulturentwicklungsplan_-_teil_1_-_charta.pdf); *Anhang: Bestandsaufnahme*. Online. Available at [www.stadt-koeln.de/mediaasset/content/pdf41/kulturentwicklungsplan\\_-\\_anlage.pdf](http://www.stadt-koeln.de/mediaasset/content/pdf41/kulturentwicklungsplan_-_anlage.pdf); *Teil 2, Maßnahmenkatalog*. Online. Available at <http://offeneskoeln.de/attachments/6/8/pdf142986.pdf>; <http://offeneskoeln.de/attachments/7/5/pdf178257.pdf> (accessed 5 June 2013).
- Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2012) *Kulturfinanzbericht 2012*, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt.
- Strittmatter, T. (2010) 'Zur Entwicklung der kulturellen Infrastruktur im Land Brandenburg seit 1990: Aspekte des kulturellen Strukturwandels in den neuen Bundesländern', *Jahrbuch der Kulturpolitik* 2010, 10: 73–92.
- Von Beyme, K. (2012) *Kulturpolitik in Deutschland: Von der Staatsförderung zur Kreativwirtschaft*, Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.

- Whyte, W.H. (1956) *The Organization Man*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Willamowski, G., Nellen, D., and Bourrée, M. (eds) (2000) *Ruhrstadt: Die andere Metropole*, Essen: Klartext Verlag.
- Wowereit, K. (2012) 'Regierungserklärung des Regierenden Bürgermeisters von Berlin, Klaus Wowereit, am 12. Januar 2012'. Online. Available at [www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/regierungserklaerung/](http://www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/regierungserklaerung/) (accessed 12 March 2013).
- Zehetmair, H. (2001) 'Föderalismus als unverzichtbares Strukturprinzip moderner Kulturpolitik', *Jahrbuch der Kulturpolitik* 2001, 2: 87–90.